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Abstract 
This study sought to understand the role that community-based organizations 
(CBOs) play in long-term recovery by examining the ways in which CBOs on the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast (MSGC) transitioned into long-term recovery from Hurricane 
Katrina. Using thematic coding of 36 in-depth interviews conducted in both 2007/8 and 
2013/14 with 21 CBO leaders from 15 different CBOs, this study found that CBOs must 
navigate a complex and often challenging political and economic context complicated by 
national policies and attitudes and local historical patterns. Despite these challenges, 
CBOs participated in LTR by acting as funding conduits, intermediary community-
government actors, cross-sector collaborators, advocates, grassroots organizers, 
researchers, and government watchdogs. The most successful CBOs were those that 
developed CBO and cross-sector collaborations, diversified their funding, and added an 
advocacy component to their mission. The study concludes with a discussion of its 
implications for long-term disaster recovery research and policy.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In the wake of recent national disasters, such as 9/11, hurricanes Katrina and 
Sandy, and the Joplin tornadoes, community-based organizations (CBOs) have become 
crucial actors in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery in the United States (Pipa, 
2006). CBOs deliver immediate disaster relief, providing communities and residents with 
basic necessities, such as food, water, and shelter (De Vita, 2006; Smith, 2012). As the 
affected area transitions into the recovery phase, CBOs become important distributors of 
recovery information and funds (Gajewski et al., 2011; Pipa, 2006). CBOs’ value in 
immediate disaster relief (IDR) and short-term recovery (STR) is well established (Pipa, 
2006). In fact, some researchers to argue that immediate disaster relief resources, as well 
as recovery funds and programs, should be handled by CBOs – “people on the ground” – 
rather than by disengaged, politically-motivated policy-makers at the federal level 
(Chamblee-Wright, 2007), while others caution that this bottom-up approach may lead to 
less federal government involvement in the disaster arena which may negatively impact 
CBOs’ ability to function effectively in response and short-term recovery (Angel et al., 
2012; Gajewski et al., 2011; Lein et al., 2009; & Smith, 2012). Despite these debates, 
most researchers and policy-makers agree that it is imperative to understand how 
increased reliance on CBOs during IDR and STR affects CBO operation and capacity. 
However, this increased reliance on CBOs also has implications for long-term 
disaster recovery (LTR) – a time in which new community needs emerge as destabilized 
pre-disaster social and physical structures are reconstructed in unpredictable ways 
(CITE). Therefore, it is critical to understand the unique challenges and roles that CBOs 
play in LTR (Chandra & Acosta, 2009). Unfortunately, disaster research has been slower 
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to study CBO roles in LTR and how the increased reliance on CBOs during IDR and STR 
impacts CBOs’ ability to transition from STR to long-term recovery (Chandra & Acosta, 
2009). As CBOs continue to play more extensive roles in disaster relief and recovery, 
disaster researchers must strive to understand how organizations handle these roles while 
navigating long-term recovery. 
The purpose of the proposed study is to understand the role that CBOs play in 
LTR by examining the ways in which CBOs on the Mississippi Gulf Coast (MSGC) have 
transitioned into LTR from Hurricane Katrina while simultaneously responding to and 
recovering from subsequent, consecutive disasters. This study uses network analysis, 
content analysis, and thematic coding of in-depth interviews to explore the ways in which 
CBOs on the MSGC are participating in, contributing to, and aaffected by long-term 
recovery. In particular, this study hopes to determine what challenges CBOs on the 
MSGC continue to face and what strategies have proven successful or not in responding 
to these challenges. In other words, just as it is important to understand the challenges, it 
is also important to identify key strategies and sources of successes. Conducted almost a 
decade after Hurricane Katrina, this study contributes to LTR research by examining one 
of the most important actors in disaster response and recovery – CBOs. Additionally, this 
study will demonstrate the value a community psychology approach can offer to disaster 
research, particularly with regard to CBOs in areas undergoing long-term recovery. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
CBOs’ Value in Response and Short-term Recovery 
CBOs have long filled service provision gaps where government social programs 
fall short (Steinberg, 2006). Recently, after some of the deadliest and costliest disasters in 
American history, CBOs also have filled gaps left by an overwhelmed national disaster 
response system, participating in both the immediate response and the subsequent 
recovery periods. Because they are well positioned to respond quickly and efficiently 
when disaster strikes, CBOs and their staff are often among the first responders (De Vita, 
2006; Smith, 2012; Weber & Messias, 2012). They are quite literally the people closest to 
ground zero, making them essential players in the immediate response period. During 
STR, CBOs also provide connection to services, dissemination of information, and new 
services or programs to meet unmet needs. For example, CBOs on the MSGC as well as 
CBOs in communities receiving Katrina evacuees responded quickly and innovatively by 
developing new programs to help clients, who had fallen between the cracks, meet their 
emergent needs (Smith, 2012, Angel et al., 2012).  Research suggests that in addition to 
being valuable assets in disaster response and recovery, CBOs also may be useful in 
community disaster preparedness (Nilsen, 2012) by disseminating information and 
providing disaster kits to clients. Thus, CBOs become valuable assets at many stages of 
disaster – preparedness, response, and short-term recovery. 
CBOs are valuable assets because they have local knowledge of and are in close 
proximity to disaster-affected communities and often have the trust of community 
members. CBO staff consists of community members and leaders who work directly with 
the most vulnerable populations in the community and therefore, are keenly aware of 
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specific (and often complex) needs within the community (Smith, 2012). Not 
surprisingly, CBOs are also the entities most knowledgeable about existing community 
strengths and resources. Frequently, CBOs are connected to these resources or are 
directly providing them to the community. This local expertise allows for quicker and 
more efficient resource allocation by preventing spending time and resources 
“reinventing the wheel” or duplicating services (Pipa, 2006). Not only does CBOs’ local 
knowledge make them valuable experts on their communities’ strengths, needs, and 
resources, but it also can make CBOs experts on their constituents’ culture. Therefore, 
CBOs can be helpful in identifying and communicating with hard-to-reach populations, 
which are often the most vulnerable residents. Distributing information to these hard-to-
reach populations is one of the major struggles in disaster response and preparedness 
(Nilsen, 2012). CBOs can be used to distribute critical information to groups of people 
who are typically overlooked and who may be suspicious of outsiders and can also be 
used to make sure that the distributed information is culturally appropriate. Receiving 
culturally appropriate information from a trusted source increases the chance of 
community buy-in (Trickett, 2011). Receipt of information and buy-in can lead to 
increased community disaster preparedness and increased access to recovery resources. 
This advantage is incredibly important given that after Hurricane Katrina, the people who 
needed help the most, did not receive it, in part, because they were unaware of programs 
for which they were qualified (GAO, 2008).  
In addition to their local knowledge, CBOs often have the trust of community 
residents. In fact, research shows community residents seem to trust CBOs more than 
governmental agencies. Along the Gulf Coast, many people – including some 
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government leaders – perceived NGOs and CBOs to be more effective in responding to 
Hurricane Katrina than local, state, and federal agencies (De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Pipa, 
2006; & Weber & Messias, 2012). In part, this perception is due to the fact that CBOs are 
less bureaucratic (in Gajewski et al., 2011) and more flexible (Smith, 2012) – 
characteristics which allow CBOs to work faster and more efficiently than government 
agencies who are restricted by rigid policies and complicated bureaucratic processes. 
Speed and efficiency are especially important during the initial response period. CBOs 
also build community trust because as the disaster area moves into the recovery phase, 
CBOs remain invested in the community long after government programs end and 
national disaster relief organizations leave to attend to the next disaster (Pipa, 2006). This 
trust, along with CBOs’ local knowledge and close proximity to the disaster area and the 
combination of rising needs and ineptitude of governmental response, has led 
communities and local and federal governments to continue to increasingly rely on CBOs 
during multiple phases of a disaster.  
CBOs’ Roles in Katrina Response and Recovery 
Increased reliance on CBOs is perhaps most apparent in Katrina IDR and STR. A 
review of Katrina disaster literature illuminates three distinct roles that CBOs, on MSGC 
in particular, have played or can play in disaster preparedness, response, and short-term 
recovery: cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, and intermediary actors. These 
roles are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. Notably, these roles all rely on CBOs’ 
position at the intersection between the community and the institutional systems that 
impact individuals and communities. Though not without its challenges, this 
intersectional position allows CBOs the opportunity to use other advantages (e.g., local 
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knowledge, close proximity, and community trust) to channel funds and information 
across sectors in order to benefit communities undergoing response and recovery from 
disaster.  
Not surprisingly, this intersectional position allows CBOs to participate in and 
develop cross-sector collaborations, which are “partnerships involving government, 
business, nonprofits and philanthropies, communities, and/or the public as a whole” 
(Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006, p. 44). In disaster contexts, these collaborations increase 
coordination among entities involved in disaster response and recovery, and coordination 
between government and nongovernment agencies is essential to a successful response 
and recovery (Angel et al., 2012; Lein et al., 2006; Pipa, 2006). Additionally, cross-sector 
collaborations allow CBOs to combine their local knowledge with expert knowledge and 
monetary resources, and they enable CBOs to have access to policy/decision-makers, 
increasing CBOs’ influence on decisions that affect the communities and the clients they 
serve. Therefore, including CBOs in cross-sector collaborations can arguably lead to 
increased community buy-in to disaster preparedness procedures and recovery processes. 
In other words, when CBOs have a seat at the table, they can better advocate for the 
community, and community members can be more confident that their interests are being 
represented. Ultimately, a government response to disaster is incomplete and ineffective 
without the help of CBOs, and CBOs cannot persist without access to government 
resources during times of extreme need (Angel et al., 2012) and cannot affect systems-
level change without access to the key players. Cross-sector collaborations are good 
opportunities to combine expert knowledge and local knowledge in order to arrive at 
better solutions that are a good fit for each community. While cross-sector collaborations 
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have become essential, CBO involvement in long-term cross-sector collaborations in an 
“underspecified and under-researched area” (Simon and Bies, 2007, p. 140). 
CBOs’ intersectional position also encourages private and government agencies to 
use CBOs as funding conduits. During the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, international 
humanitarian relief organizations began funneling funds and resources to CBOs who 
were on the ground and could distribute funds quickly with limited bureaucracy 
(Gajewski et al., 2011; Pipa, 2006). Using CBOs as funding conduits also works as a 
checks and balances for the allocation of recovery resources, rendering resource and 
funds allocation more transparent and increases the chance that these resources will be 
directed to the community. Without accountability, recovery funds may not be used to 
benefit communities in need. In Mississippi, many federal funds were funneled through 
the governor’s office, and when HUD funneled $5.481 billion through the governor’s 
office (Defense Appropriations Act, 2006), much of this money went to fund the 
governor’s economic development projects that did not directly benefit the most 
vulnerable populations for whom the money was originally dedicated (Weber & Smith, 
2013). Using CBOs as funding conduits can lead to more equitable and efficient 
allocation of resources.  
One of the most important ways that CBOs function is as intermediate actors that 
communicate important information across multiple sectors. CBOs can communicate 
federal and state regulations to the local community and educate residents on the 
recovery processes and disaster preparation. In addition to transferring information 
“down” from “experts,” alternatively, CBOs also can transfer local information and 
concerns “up” to policy-makers. In this capacity, CBOs advocate for community 
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concerns as they arise during the recovery process. On the MSGC, CBOs who began as 
service providers became explicitly involved in advocacy in addition to their service 
provision either by adding advocacy to their mission or by joining advocacy 
collaborations. For example, the STEPS Coalition formed in 2008 in response to the dire 
housing need on the Coast and the coalition consisted of CBOs (Weber, 2014). One of its 
biggest successes includes forcing the state to return some of the money it had reallocated 
to a failed economic project to housing, resulting in a new housing program. Then, 
STEPS helped inform the community about the program. Their position at the 
intersection between system and community levels not only makes CBOs effective 
advocates but also makes them key conveyers of important information.  
CBO Challenges  
CBOs face multiple challenges that arise during IDR and STR that inhibit their 
ability to fill service gaps and function in both new and existing roles in disaster contexts. 
For example, CBOs must continue to meet clients’ continuing and increasing needs while 
recovering themselves. In Mississippi, 93% of CBOs reported a loss of programs and 
services because of Hurricane Katrina (Mississippi Center for Nonprofits, n.d.). In the 
emergency phase of recovery (Kane, 1977), staff members and their families are in 
recovery and may be unable to return home and to work, resulting in staff shortages 
(CITE), burnout, and nefarious mental health effects (Weber & Messias, 2012). 
Additionally, CBOs must respond to and enact policies that they have little say or power 
in developing or changing, and progress is hindered by the lack of opportunity to take 
part fully in decision- and policy-making that effect CBOs and the communities that they 
serve. Both of these challenges often lead to staff disillusionment and burnout. 
	 
9	
One of the biggest challenges that CBOs face during IDR and STR is lacking the 
organizational capacity and expertise necessary to respond to the increased demands that 
arise in IDR and STR. Disasters often demand changes in nature of services or 
development of new services altogether in order to meet emergent needs. Organizational 
capacity includes access to resources and funding and availability of staff. Lack of 
capacity coupled with increased demands limit CBOs’ ability to carry out their main 
functions – service provision and/or advocacy – as well as their ability to engage in new 
roles, such as cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, and intermediate actors. 
Cumulative effects of carrying out new services indefinitely without the capacity to do so 
in IDR can lead to negative and cumulative effects in STR and LTR. Often, those CBOs 
that do attempt to meet these demands without the capacity and expertise to do so, end up 
suffering long-term. Not only are CBOs unable to carry out primary functions or service 
provision and advocacy, but they also are unable to continue functioning as an 
organization. In New Orleans, after Hurricane Katrina, the number of CBOs dropped. 
Many cited lack of capacity and increased needs as contributing factors.    
The nature of services change during a disaster context and CBOs do not have the 
expertise and resources to adapt to this change. Taking on new and crucial roles in both 
immediate disaster response and short-term recovery efforts (Pipa, 2006) often involves 
CBOs serving new types of clients and providing services that fall outside of their areas 
of expertise and for which they do not have the capacity to provide. Many CBOs are 
woefully unprepared for the roles they end up playing in disasters (Nilsen, 2012), and 
being organizationally prepared for disaster – i.e., having a disaster plan – does not mean 
that CBOs are prepared to provide disaster services outside the realm of their expertise 
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and capacity. For example, in the immediate response to Hurricane Katrina, CBOs on the 
Gulf Coast provided shelter and emergency disaster relief despite the fact that few of 
these organizations included disaster relief in their missions or had appropriate resources 
available for this type of disaster response (Pipa, 2006). In fact, as of October 5, 2005, 
Louisiana and Mississippi CBOs were sheltering almost as many people as the American 
Red Cross (ARC) (Pipa, 2006) but with arguably fewer resources and training than the 
ARC or other government organizations charged with disaster response (Smith, 2012). 
Because CBOs find themselves with a new client base and often meeting basic needs that 
are outside of the CBO’s mission (Smith, 2012), CBOs also find themselves changing the 
nature of their services permanently (Auer & Lampkin, 2006; De Vita & Morley, 2007). 
This type of change can influence funding sources and staff. In addition to not having 
adequate training in disaster response (e.g., triage, working in hazardous conditions), 
CBOs lack the funding and staff to respond to the vast needs that arise. Even in-kind 
donations and managing volunteers are difficult without the capacity. Capacity and 
expertise are essential to CBO function in IDR and STR.  
CBOs’ degree of capacity and expertise in IDR has implications for their ability 
to engage in STR. Even those CBOs who have the capacity and expertise to successfully 
integrate disaster response into their mission, many CBOs often lack the capacity to carry 
out these new services indefinitely (Pipa, 2006). In the subsequent short-term recovery 
period, CBOs on the MSGC continued to provide services for individuals and 
communities who did not qualify for federal and state recovery programs without any 
compensation for these new services. Additionally, CBOs faced many and, often, 
unanticipated challenges in the initial response phase of a disaster that affected CBO 
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service provision in later short-term recovery. Despite being stretched beyond their initial 
capacity, many CBOs on the MSGC were not reimbursed for their services by FEMA or 
governments that greatly relied on these CBOs, which affected ability to CBOs’ ability to 
provide disaster-related and regular services during the short-term recovery phase (GAO, 
2008). Unfortunately, little research shows the effects on LTR. 
Recognizing capacity limitations, disaster researchers and practitioners – 
including emergency responders, policy–makers, and government entities – agree that 
CBOs should be incorporated more explicitly and comprehensively into disaster 
preparedness, response, and recovery and that CBO capacity must be cultivated before 
and after a disaster (De Vita, Kramer et al., 2008; De Vita & Morley, 2007; Gajewski et 
al., 2011; GAO, 2008; & Pipa, 2006). For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
a GAO report (2008) recommended that FEMA increase their coordination with CBOs 
and contribute to capacity and to address funding issues of reimbursement. In a report for 
the Aspen Institute, Pipa (2006) recommended that policymakers increase funding and 
activities to include CBOs in decision-making and disaster training. Recognizing this 
limitation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a 2008 GAO report recommended that 
funders allocate operational grants to keep local CBOs functioning during a disaster. 
Building CBO capacity pre-disaster and continuing to invest in capacity building post-
disaster is crucial because during and after a disaster, CBOs must continue to serve 
constituents as well as recovery themselves – both on an institutional and individual 
level. Researchers and practitioners, alike, agree that CBOs have multiple advantages to 
offer at all stages of disaster and to multiple levels, including the individual, community, 
and governmental levels.  
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Gaps in the Literature 
Despite recognizing that capacity affects the ability of CBOs to respond to 
disaster challenges and that continuing to provide services without the capacity to do so 
can lead to unresolved challenges in STR and LTR, disaster research has been slow to 
research CBOs’ roles in long-term recovery and how CBOs continue to engage disaster 
recovery while negotiating their organization’s identity in light of the new disaster 
context. For example, though we know that initially, CBOs offer services outside of their 
stated mention, scant research exists on if and how CBOs continue offering these services 
during long-term recovery. Knowing this information is crucial because donors during 
disasters are usually more interested in short-term recovery and relief and less interested 
in long-term recovery or administrative costs (in Gajewski et al., 2011) – both of which 
organizations cite as necessary (Nilsen, 2012). Additionally, despite the influx of 
volunteers during periods immediately after a disaster, these volunteers often decrease as 
time goes on (Smith, 2012) and are unequipped to deal with long-term recovery services, 
like job training (in Gajewski et al., 2011). Gawjewski et al. (2011) recommend that local 
nonprofits begin advocating at the federal level for long-term recovery and should 
encourage donors and the general public to donate to long-term recovery (Gajewski et al., 
2011, USHCHS Democratic Staff Report, n.d.). First, research on how to best use these 
funds is necessary. Researchers and practitioners need an understanding of how CBOs 
continue to build capacity, the struggles they experience, and the roles that they play in 
long-term disaster recovery before we can develop best practices for CBOs serving areas 
undergoing long-term recovery. 
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In addition to navigating the effects of disasters on CBO mission and functioning, 
CBOs must also navigate changing socio-political contexts. Unfortunately, little research 
exists on this process in LTR. Disasters occur within a pre-existing socio-political context 
that can hinder or hurt certain CBOs agendas. The pre-existing context affects capacity 
building at individual, organizational, and community levels. Context determines who is 
affected by a disaster and who recovers and who does not recover (Weber, 2014). 
However, it is important to consider what happens when a disaster occurs and the context 
changes. Certain groups at these multiple levels stand to benefit or lose when familiar 
structures are no longer in place. Of course, disasters are necessarily political events 
(Klein, 2007). Disaster can be an opportunity to revise harmful structures in a way that is 
more advantageous to those groups previously disadvantaged. However, often what 
happens is that those who are already in power are able to achieve agendas that may be 
further harmful to disadvantaged populations by taking advantage of the momentary 
lapse in accountability and dismantling of the social structure (Klein, 2007). 
Renegotiating Identity/mission for LT within this context and often politically charged 
environment. It is important to understand the impact that the sociopolitical context has 
on long-term recovery efforts, and unfortunately little research is available. 
Furthermore, scant research exists on how CBOs operate in areas that have 
experienced (or are at risk for experiencing) multiple disasters of various types. This gap 
is unfortunate given the fact that research shows that LTR is more complicated and takes 
longer after multiple disasters (Chandra & Acosta, 2009; Public Entity Risk Institute, 
2009). Multiple disasters slow the recovery process because they often result in increased 
competing priorities with limited resources and prevalence in mental illness, which can 
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become compounded (Chandra & Acosta, 2009). It is important to understand how CBOs 
continue to make progress in areas that experience multiple disasters because many 
disaster-affected communities exist in geographic locations that increase their 
vulnerability to disasters, and therefore, the same community may experiences various 
types of disasters almost simultaneously. Because disaster risk is a combination of 
geographic, social, and political factors, many times the same geographic location or 
group of people are most vulnerable to disasters (Cutter, 2003). Disaster is not a static 
event but a continuation of ongoing inequalities and new struggles arise that can impede 
recovery. In other words, many communities will likely experience multiple disasters in a 
short amount of time, and these communities are often the most vulnerable and least 
capable of responding successfully. They will rely disproportionately on CBOs in their 
area. 
In a rare investigation of long-term recovery and CBOS in Louisiana, Chandra 
and Acosta (2009) found that little federal support existed for CBOs working toward 
long-term human recovery. Instead, the federal government focused mostly on 
infrastructure and economic recovery. Additionally, CBOs struggled to find guidance and 
protocol for long-term case management. Chandra and Acosta (2009) concluded: “more 
investigation is warranted to determine NGOs’ roles during recovery and to outline how 
government can better support NGOs in human recovery efforts” (p. 10). This study takes 
on this challenge and explores if CBOs in long-term recovery experience challenges 
similar to challenges faced in STR and examines new challenges and roles that emerge in 
LTR.  
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework 
This study relies heavily on an ecological systems framework to explore and 
conceptualize CBOs’ roles in long-term disaster recovery. Ecological frameworks 
recognize the interaction between the individual and his or her environment, arguing that 
human behavior is influenced by physical, social, economic, and political environments 
(Dalton, Elias, & Wandersman, 2001; Trickett, 1996). These environments function in 
terms of systems that interact with each other, and these systems include the micro-, 
meso-, exo-, macro-, and chronosystems that fan out concentrically from the individual. 
In Brofenbrenner’s model (1979) this individual is the child and the systems make up the 
child’s social ecology. Where the microsystem typically includes individuals and groups 
who have direct contact with the child (e.g., parents, friends, church, and school), the 
mesosystem includes interactions between multiple entities in the child’s microsystem 
(e.g., parent-teacher and family-church interactions). The exosystem includes institutions, 
agencies, and structures that indirectly affect the child and his or her microsystems but 
with which the child does not have direct contact. Similarly, the child has no direct 
contact with the macrosystem, which consists of social, cultural, and political systems 
that affect other systems and levels within the model. Because of the nested nature of 
these levels, changes in one level produce changes in another level (Brofenbrenner, 
1979). While Brofenbrenner’s social ecological theory originally described a child’s 
interaction with his or her environment, this model has been used by multiple disciplines 
to understanding how different systems affect each other across multiple levels and how 
they impact communities and individuals.  
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I build upon existing ecological systems frameworks by adapting them to more 
accurately reflect CBO involvement in disaster contexts. First, I augment 
Brofenbrenner’s (1979) frameworks by incorporating aspects of Weber’s (2010) feminist 
intersectionality framework – particularly its emphasis on power as a unit of analysis. 
This intersectionality framework describes social systems as power relationships that are 
simultaneously expressed at multiple levels. Because ecological systems are necessarily 
power-laden, power is an essential unit of analysis in intersectional frameworks (Weber, 
2010). Without understanding the function of power, an analysis may miss important 
contextual and environmental factors that impact an individual or community. Therefore, 
research stemming from an intersectionality framework often uses discourse analysis to 
deconstruct ideologies and uncover power dynamics and political interests. A power 
analysis is especially useful in a disaster context, because disasters temporarily or 
permanently disrupt systems at multiple levels, and this disruption can be used to 
restructure the power relationships to benefit marginalized groups – or to further bolster 
those people and systems in power (Klein, 2007). Community organizations play an 
important role in this restructuring but do not operate outside these systems, placing them 
both in a potentially powerful or potentially vulnerable position simultaneously. Because 
they operate at the nexus of many of these systems and serve as the nexus between the 
community and the “powers-that-be,” CBOs can be powerful advocates for marginalized 
groups. They also rely on resources and funds dependent upon these other levels. 
Therefore, understanding power dynamics among and between ecological systems is 
incredibly important when examining CBO’s operating in a disaster context. 
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In addition to encouraging power as a unit of analysis, this intersectionality 
framework also emphasizes that systems across multiple levels are simultaneously 
expressed and are geographically and historically situated. Both ecological systems and 
intersectional theories recognize the importance of context; however, intersectionality 
framework emphasizes the historical and geographical contexts’ influence on all 
relationships among and across systems. In other words, historical and geographical 
contexts are not located within a systems level. Rather, they impact the system’s ecology 
(See Figure 1). This difference is important for understanding CBOs in a disaster context 
because it allows for studying how disaster changes these contexts and influences the 
relationships among systems. Within this framework, disaster is not an event in time that 
merely affects systems; it’s a context or state within which ecological systems are 
situated.  
My model attempts to capture this nuance, to represent CBOs’ unique 
intersectional roles, and to create the opportunity to study the function of power and 
ideology within these systems. The model seeks to capture the disaster context as it gives 
rise to CBOs’ cross-level roles by removing the chronosystem as a separate system 
operating outside of the model. Instead, the model is situated within historical and 
geographical context. Similar to Pfefferbaum and colleagues (2012) who noted that 
disasters “activate” the mesosystem to form linkages, I argue that disasters create a 
special context in which systems become unstable and CBOs emerge as entities that link 
and mediate across levels, functioning as cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, 
and community-government liaisons and operating at the intersection of multiple levels 
of analysis. Perhaps the most notable difference is the model represents CBOs as cutting 
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across levels. Most ecological models locate CBOs within one level. For example, within 
Brofenbrenner’s model, community-based and service organizations typically fit within 
the exosystem level of the framework. Some adaptations of the model include a 
“community-level” within which CBOs often fit (Kelly, 1968; Perkins, Silberman, & 
Brown, 2003). Others categorize CBOs as entities that facilitate mesosystem interactions 
(Pfefferbaum et al., 2012). In order to more accurately reflect CBOs’ unique 
intersectional roles in a disaster context, my model conceptualizes CBOs as entities that 
cut across levels rather than as firmly located within any one system. Therefore, my 
framework represents CBOs in disasters as intersecting multiple levels, part of and 
influenced by power relationships among and across systems, and placed within a 
geographically and historically situated context defined or marked by disaster. 
 
Figure 1. Ecological Systems Framework Figure 2: CBOs Disaster Ecological Model 
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Chapter 4. Current Investigation 
 Employing this framework, this applied research study sought to understand 
CBOs’ experiences with long-term recovery in an effort to inform policy and research. It 
concentrated on CBOs on the Mississippi Gulf Coast (MSGC) because the MSGC is 
currently undergoing LTR from Hurricane Katrina, has experienced multiple disasters of 
varying types, and has a unique political context, offering the opportunity to address gaps 
in research. Less than a month after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005, Hurricane 
Rita struck the MSGC, followed by Hurricane Gustav in 2008, and Hurricane Isaac in 
2009. In addition to hurricanes, the housing and economic crisis of 2008 critically 
affected the Coast. Because the area was already impoverished, the economic crisis 
effects were even more significant. In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon (BP) Oil Spill, 
though causing little structural damage, further suppressed the economy by hindering the 
tourism and Vietnamese fishing industries, leading to rising unemployment and 
decreased tax revenue. Despite these multiple disasters, preliminary analysis of 2013 
qualitative interviews suggested that CBOs on the MSGC have managed to continue to 
grow and build capacity. In fact, more CBOs exist on the Coast today than pre-Katrina 
(NCCS, 2014). Additionally, data suggested that the Coast has more cross-sector 
collaborations post-Katrina than before the storm. Given the number and severity of these 
disasters and the effects that they have had on an already impoverished area, 
understanding how these CBOs have continued to thrive can inform how researchers and 
practitioners approach and manage other domestic disasters.    
In addition to thriving despite multiple disasters, CBOs on the MSGC are 
operating within a unique socio-political context. Therefore, focusing on this area offers 
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the opportunity to explore the effects of socio-political context on LTR and how power 
dynamics affect CBO operation. Situated within a republican state, the MSGC considers 
itself more “liberal” and “cosmopolitan” than the rest of the state. CBO leaders on the 
MSGC felt that the Coast’s more moderate political leanings put it at odds with the 
state’s conservative government and rising Tea Party movement (Weber & Smith, 2013). 
Additionally, the Coast considers itself to be different from the rest of the state socio-
economically, racially, and educationally. Indeed, it is more racially diverse than the rest 
of the state, and despite being a “working coast,” with socio-economic and education 
levels well below the national averages, the Coast does have much higher socio-
economic status and education levels than the rest of the state (US Census, 2010). Despite 
these differences from the rest of the state, in some ways, the conservative government 
worked to advantage the Coast because Governor Barbour, who had close ties with 
President Bush, managed to secure a disproportionate amount of federal money for 
Mississippi in the period following Katrina (Weber & Smith, 2013). Focusing on CBOs 
on the MSGC not only allowed me to explore how this unique context changed after 
subsequent disasters, but it also allowed me to examine if and how CBOs navigated the 
complex power dynamics in this recovery process.  
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Research Questions 
Because this study is one of the first to examine CBOs undergoing LTR, the research 
approach was largely exploratory. In order to address gaps in current research, this study 
explored the following questions concerning CBOs on the MSGC: 
1. What changes has LTR had on the economic, political, social, and physical 
environment on the MSGC, and how have these changes affected CBOs’ 
operation?  
2. How are CBOs on the MSGC participating in and contributing to LTR?  
3. How is LTR affecting CBOs’ ability to build capacity and provide services and to 
the community?  
4. Does CBOs’ involvement in a collaborative network increase CBO power to 
participate in and affect LTR?  
Based on existing research, I expected that CBOs on the MSGC would have experienced 
significant changes in operation due to changes in the economic, political, social, and 
physical environment. Furthermore, I predicted that CBOs on the MSGC would continue 
to be important players in LTR from Hurricane Katrina by serving as cross-sector 
collaborators, funding conduits, and community-government liaisons. Additionally, those 
CBOs that have continued to be players would be those organizations that have been able 
to overcome challenges associated with short-term recovery and long-term recovery. 
Ultimately, I anticipated that CBOs who have continued to be players in LTR would be 
those CBOs who were more involved in both pre-disaster and post-disaster collaborations 
and who were highly connected to other organizations and sectors. 
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Chapter 5. Methods 
This study involved two phases of data collection, including data from an original 
study conducted in 2007 and 2008 as part of a 2007 National Science Foundation grant 
looking at inequalities in recovery on the Mississippi Gulf Coast (Grant CMMI-0623991) 
as well as a follow-up study in 2013 and 2014 (USC Provost Grant, 2012). The first study 
took an exploratory approach, gathering data across multiple groups involved in recovery 
from Hurricane Katrina. Using purposeful sampling and snowballing techniques, 
researchers identified and interviewed 56 key leaders and residents involved in disaster 
recovery in Gulfport, Biloxi, Diamond Head, Pass Christian, Waveland, and Bay St. 
Louis from Hancock and Harrison County. These towns were chosen because of their 
proximity to landfall and the amount of damage incurred (Figure 3). Though all within 
thirty miles of each other, these towns varied in terms of size and socio-economic 
makeup. Key findings from this initial study included: 
• Because of their insider/outsider status, NGOs and CBOs played a crucial role in 
multiple stages of recovery: as first responders and as community members 
invested in long-term recovery. However, CBO workers experienced physical and 
mental distress because of insufficient resources and capacity to deal with 
emerging and exacerbated needs and the difficulty of navigating socio-political 
processes (Weber & Messias, 2011).   
• Power dynamics benefitting a government/business alliance governed decision-
making and kept needed resources out of local communities (Weber, 2014). 
• CBOs leveraged their collective power to affect decision-making by forming an 
advocacy coalition – Steps Coalition (Weber, 2014; www.stepscoalition.org).  
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Figure 3. Mississippi Gulf Coast Damage Estimates. 
 
*Retrieved 15 Jun 2015 from: 
http://www.southernspaces.org/sites/southernspaces.org/files/images/2008/1a-002-ss-08-katrina_lg.gif 
 
 
The second phase involved a 2013/14 follow-up study that attempted to reconnect 
with previous participants in order to examine the long-term recovery experiences of 
CBOs on the Gulf Coast after subsequent disasters. Based on findings from the previous 
study, researchers chose to focus more intensely on the experiences of community-based 
organizations. In addition to CBOs, the follow-up study, using snowballing and 
theoretical sampling, recruited organizations not represented in the first study and new 
organizations that had emerged in the previous three years. Unlike the original study, the 
follow-up study emphasized depth over breadth, focusing on the CBO sector.  
Data and Units of Analysis 
The data used in the present study consisted of 721 transcribed semi-structured 
interviews, public documents, and field notes collected from both the original and follow-
up studies.2 Zooming in on organizations and their context, the present study focused on 
the CBOs who participated in both 2007 and 2013 follow-up studies, resulting in 21 
unique participants from 15 organizations. These data allowed for inquiry at individual, 
																																																								
1 Includes 6-month follow-ups in 2008 for 3 participants. Also, considers interviews with two participants 
as one interview.  
2 Interview guides for both studies are included in the appendix. 
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organizational, and socio-political environment levels of analysis. The following sections 
describe the data used to inform each level of analysis. 
Individuals. A total of 73 unique individuals participated in the 2008 and 2013 
studies. These individuals included key leaders in recovery from the business community, 
local and state governments, university community, and nonprofit community. Fifty-six 
percent (56%) of participants were women (n=41). Forty-three (43) of these key leaders 
worked for CBOs. Of these 43 CBO leaders, 13 participants were interviewed in both 
2008 and 2013, allowing for a longitudinal analysis of the process of recovery for those 
individuals. This study also includes 8 interviewees whose organizations participated in 
both studies, but they themselves only participated in either 2007 only (n=3) or 2013 only 
(n=5). Because of staff turnover, the same representatives/interviewees from each CBO 
was not always possible. Figure 4 illustrates the breakdown of individuals.	
 
Figure 4. Individuals from 2007/8 and 2013/14 Interviews Included in Current Study 
Of the 21 participants, 62% were female (n=13) and 38% were male (n=8). The 
majority (62%) of participants were White (n=13). African American and Latino/a 
participants each made up 14% of respondents respectively (nAA=3, nLat=3). These 
breakdowns were similar to Census Bureau data at that time that shows Biloxi to be 64% 
73	Individuals	
8	Business	Leaders	 12	Government	Leaders	 43	Community	Leaders	
21	in	current	study	
3	in	2007	only	 5	in	2013	only	 13	in	both	2007	&	2013	
10	Residents	
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White, 19% African American, and 9% Latino/a. Therefore, this sample had slightly 
more Latino/a representation and slightly less African American representation (2010). 
See Figures 5 and 6 below. Twelve of the 21 participants were executive directors of their 
organizations. The other 9 interviewees had overlapping roles that included advocacy, 
organizing, and service provision. 
 
Figure 5. Participant Racial Percentages  Figure 6. Biloxi Racial Percentages  
(n=21)                                                             (US Census, 2010) 
 
Organizations. A total of 43 people were interviewed from 32 organizations in 
both 2007/8 and 2013/14. Of these organizations, 46.9% participated in both studies 
(n=15); 37.5% participated in the first study only (n=12); and 15.6% participated in the 
second study only (n=5). The majority of the 12 previously interviewed organizations 
that did not participate in the second study were either no longer viable organizations 
(n=5); no longer had a presence on the Gulf Coast (i.e., were located elsewhere and had 
temporary branches on Coast only immediately after Katrina, n=5); or were unable to 
meet with interviewers due to scheduling conflicts (n=2). Researchers made extensive 
efforts to contact these 12 organizations and/or their former leaders because their 
perspective would greatly enhance the study. However, many former leaders had left the 
coast, and research assistants were unable to locate them. Thankfully, the follow-up study 
62%	14%	14%	
5%	 5%	 White	African	American	Latino/a	Asian	 64%	
19%	
9%	4%	 4%	 White	African	American	Latino/a	Asian	
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did include the perspective of organizations representative of these two types of 
organizations – defunct or removed.    
 
Figure 7. CBOs from 2007/8 and 2013/14 Interviews Included in Current Study 
 
The 15 organizations that participated in both studies included both pre-Katrina 
and post-Katrina organizations. Eight organizations were primarily service organizations 
and six were primarily advocacy organizations (one organization was a 
lender/educational organization). However, seven organizations were explicitly involved 
in both advocacy and service, and many others engaged informally in both, even though 
their mission statements may privilege one or the other focus. The majority of the 
participating organizations was housing organizations or at least involved a housing 
component (n=9). Additionally, most CBOs were located in Biloxi (n=11) or Gulfport 
(n=4).  
Relying on variations of existing definitions for CBOs, the study considered 
CBOs to be organizations that are: 1) non-profit; 2) non-governmental; 3) secular or 
faith-based; and 4) provide either direct services and/or advocacy for individuals (Austin, 
2012). The classification included advocacy organizations because these organizations 
know the needs of various niche groups in the community and may connect individuals to 
direct services. It also included local branches of national organizations but not 
32	CBOs	
12	CBOs	2007	only	
5	CBOs	relocated/left	area	 5	CBOs	defunct	 2	CBOs	scheduling	conKlict	
15	CBOs	in	2007	&	2013	
15	CBOs	in	Current	Study	
5	CBOs	2013	Only	
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extensions of national organizations that did not have a permanent presence in the 
community.  
Socio-political environment. In tandem with conducting interviews, research 
assistants collected and examined numerous public and government documents and 
newspaper articles and observed community meetings in an effort to understand the 
context and political dynamics within the community. The majority of documents 
included the state’s recovery “Action Plans” published on the Mississippi Development 
Authority’s (MDA) website, United States Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
documentation available on the HUD website, and state and local newspaper articles. 
Along with interviews, these documents helped reconstruct the socio-political 
environment within which CBOs were operating at multiple levels, including local, state, 
and national levels. 
Researchers’ Positionality 
Keeping with my commitment to feminist intersectionality, I recognize the impact of 
my own positionality on data collection and analysis. In the spirit of self-disclosure and 
reflexivity: I am white female from the American South. At the time of the study, I was 
in my late twenties and had lived in the South all of my life. Therefore, I was well 
acquainted with southern rural culture and had a heavy accent, making me easily 
accepted into the community of interest. I was drawn to this study, in part, because of a 
commitment to social advocacy and also because I had a traumatic experience with a 
natural disaster as a child. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo devastated my hometown, a rural 
impoverished area in South Carolina. Unlike the MSGC, this area had little assistance 
from CBOs because no CBOs or formal service networks existed. The area received little 
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government assistance and, arguably, is still recovering. This study also interested me 
because of the high amount of women working in CBO leadership roles on the MSGC. I 
feel a commitment to show the often under-appreciated work of women in their 
communities and the power they garner through collaboration.   
The other two interviewers for the 2013 study were white women in their sixties. One 
of these interviewers was born and raised in the South, and the other interviewer had 
lived in the South for over 20 years. The interviewers from the 2008 study included two 
white male graduate students and two white females – one graduate student and one 
professor – all from the University of South Carolina. While I collaborated with some of 
these researchers in brainstorming themes and initial coding in 2013/4, the following 
analysis is my own. 
Analysis 
This study examined interviews and documents using thematic coding informed by 
my CBO Disaster Ecological Systems Framework. This qualitative method was useful for 
examining data at multiple levels – individual, organizational, community, and socio-
political levels – as well as for understanding the operation of power across and within 
these levels. To address the first research question regarding context, I focused on codes 
dealing with context and power in all interviews and public documents from 2007/8 to 
2013/4. Because I was interested in the overall context, I included interviews from all 
respondents, including business and government interviewees at this initial step. To 
understand CBOs’ roles and operation in long-term recovery (research questions 2 and 
3), I focused primarily on the CBO interviews from 2013. However, I compared codes on 
CBO operation and roles in 2008 with 2013 in order to understand how these changed. 
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Finally, in order to examine the nature of CBO collaborations and CBOs’ ability to 
garner power in LTR (research question four), I examined codes from both 2007/8 and 
2013/4 concerning ties to other CBOs and entities across sectors. I also examined public 
documents to a get a sense of their visibility in the community. See Table 1 for a 
breakdown of research questions and methods.  
Research Question Data Source Method Software 
1. What changes has LTR had on the 
economic, political, social, and 
physical environment on the 
MSGC?  
• All 2007/8 & 
2013/4 
interviews 
• Public 
Documents 
• Thematic 
coding 
• Review of 
documents 
• NVivo 
1. How are CBOs on the MSGC 
participating in and contributing to 
long-term recovery? 
• 2013/4 CBO 
interviews 
• Thematic 
coding 
• NVivo 
2. How is long-term recovery 
affecting CBOs’ ability to build 
capacity? 
• 2013/4 CBO 
interviews 
• Thematic 
coding 
• NVivo 
3. Does CBOs’ involvement in a 
collaborative network increase 
CBO power to participate in and 
affect LTR?  
 
• 2007/8 and 
2013/4 CBO 
interviews 
• CBO websites 
• Public 
documents 
• NCCS 
database 
• Thematic 
coding 
• Review of 
documents 
 
 
 
 
• NVivo 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Analysis by Research Question 
I began the analysis by reading through all interview transcripts for both 2007/8 
and 2013/4, including business leader and government leader interviews, taking notes of 
emerging themes and questions in my project journal. I sketched a rough coding 
framework that contained broad themes, filling them in with sub-nodes as I went along. 
Then using NVivo software, I coded 2007/8 CBO interviews, starting with a couple of 
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“typical” interviews that contained many of the themes I identified in the first read-
through. I used an open coding, coding in vivo for emergent themes. I also used a priori 
codes developed from the research questions, interview schedule, and my initial read-
through. After coding 2007/8 interviews, I moved to 2013/4 interviews using a similar 
strategy. I created memos as I coded to help generate ideas and potential frameworks and 
also to help track the coding process. I coded by interview rather than by theme/code 
because this strategy helped me keep the “big picture” in the forefront of my mind during 
coding. This strategy also assisted analysis in highlighting for me where certain processes 
and issues that were affecting CBOs (and that they were affecting) were “located”. In 
other words, this strategy helped me “define the problem” more contextually.  
As codes became saturated and new codes stopped emerging, I collapsed both 
emergent codes and a priori codes into themes that I arranged into a paradigm that 
reflected my proposed CBOs Disaster Ecological Model. Therefore, about halfway 
through coding the 2007/8 interviews, I organized the codes based on the different levels 
within the model. Initially, I grouped existing codes into 6 levels – or “parent nodes” in 
NVivo: “Context,” “Macrosystem,” “Exosystem,” “Mesosystem,” “Microsystem,” and 
“Individual.” I also included a “CBO” level. I soon realized that codes might belong to 
more than one level or parent node. For example, while mental health may be expressed 
at an individual level, many interviewees discussed it as a community-level phenomenon 
and affected by micro-, meso-, and macro-level phenomena, showing that this code exists 
at multiple levels. Additionally, “Feelings and Attitudes” can work across levels such that 
an individual can have attitudes about government and CBOs; communities can have 
attitudes about and toward government and individuals; and governments can have 
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attitudes about certain communities and individuals. Finally, interviewees referred to 
certain events that impacted every level. For example, the Great Recession, the 2008 
housing crisis, and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Therefore, I added “Multiple 
Levels,” “Across Levels,” and “Events” codes to capture themes that cut across, exists 
between, or impacts all levels. By organizing codes this way, I hoped to illustrate the 
usefulness of my model. This strategy also helped me begin to think contextually at the 
early stages of analysis.  
Analysis of public documents from HUD, the MDA, local and national 
newspapers, legal records, and CBO website content proceeded a bit differently. While I 
did not engage in systematic coding of these documents, I did use them to track 
government funds and to inform my understanding of the political context. For example, 
in the interviews, discrepancies emerged between community leaders in different sectors 
(i.e., government, business, and CBOs). One discrepancy regarded the diversion of 
money from a housing recovery program to an economic development project at the Port 
of Gulfport. CBO leaders, while not necessarily opposed to the Port, did not approve of 
the diversion of funds from a housing program to an economic development project 
because of widespread unmet housing needs. Business leaders insisted that the money 
was always earmarked for the Port and that CBO leaders “just did not understand the way 
funds were allocated.” An (extensive) investigation of public documents between MDA 
and HUD revealed that the money was indeed diverted from the Housing Assistance 
Program (MDA, 2006a; MDA 2007; & Weber & Smith, 2012). While the goal of this 
project was not necessarily to investigate recovery funds and allocation, having access to 
these documents helped me understand the intense research process that CBO leaders 
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went through to keep on top of recovery processes as well as helped me to understand the 
ways in which certain stories about recovery were being perpetuated and what purpose 
they served and for whom. 
Therefore, the majority of analysis involved thematic coding and content analysis 
of interviews and documents by the primary researcher. While analysis is based on one 
coder, a research assistant did assist with checking the reliability of my final coding 
structure based on the Disaster Ecological Systems model. She coded some of the more 
representative interviews using the coding framework. When comparing our coding, we 
achieved high agreement for sections coded (with a Kappa > 96 for all codes). Although 
the codes were mine, this finding implies that multiple users using this codebook can 
produce reliable codes. Please see Appendix I for codebook. 
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Chapter 6. Results 
 Results are presented much like the analysis, with a focus on context first. In 
order to investigate the way CBOs operate in LTR, I first needed to understand the 
context within which CBOs were working and simultaneously impacting. Understanding 
this context was pivotal to understanding the challenges and successes of the CBOs on 
the Mississippi Gulf Coast and the LTR processes in which they were participating. 
Therefore, the results section begins with a detailed analysis of the socio-political, 
economic, historical, and geographic context and its implications for CBOs and then 
proceeds to examine CBOs’ roles in LTR situated within this context. I address the 
remaining research questions pertaining to LTR impacts on CBOs by discussing CBOs’ 
challenges and successes throughout these sections. Most of these challenges, and 
subsequently, CBOs’ strengths, emerged in relation to the disaster context and the roles 
they played. I emphasize CBO collaborations as they emerged as one of the strengths of 
CBOs. While interviewees brought up many important and complex themes, particularly 
with regard to context and their roles in it, I discuss only those that have the strongest 
implications for understanding CBO operation in LTR. 
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Context and Macrosystem Influences 
Eco-Level Theme Sub-theme 
Interview Coverage 
# References #Interviews 
Context Historical   41 18 
 Political/Economic   164 29 
  *National 58 23 
  *State 71 22 
  *Local 48 18 
 Geographical/Physical  15 7 
Macrosystem Racism  88 26 
Context x 
Macrosystem  
Historical x Racism- 
History of Racism 
 17 11 
*Perception of 
racism 
6 6 
*Effects of 
racism 
9 8 
     
Table 2. Interview Coverage for “Contextual” and “Macrosystem” Influences  
* Child nodes can overlap. 
 
To examine changes in the socio-political and economic context within which 
CBOs are located, I reviewed text coded for “context” in both 2013 and 2007 interviews, 
looking for similarities and differences. I divided “Context” into three main “child 
nodes”: “Geographical/Physical Context,” “Historical Context,” and “Political/Economic 
Context.” The “Political/Economic Context” code had by far the most coded references 
(n=343 across 29 different interviews), followed by “Historical Context” (n=42 across 19 
interviews), and then “Geographical/Physical Context” (n=15 across 7 interviews). Upon 
review, “Political/Economic Context” also could be divided into three child nodes: 
“National,” “State.” and “Local.”3 Often, these nodes overlapped and intersected. For 
example, “National,” “State,” and “Local” political/economic context child nodes were 
																																																								
3 The same local, state, and national division arguably could apply to “Historical Context” and 
“Geographical/Physical Context” codes. However, these distinctions did not surface in interviews for these 
nodes. 
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dependent on each other even while they diverged. The change in presidential 
administrations from Republican to Democrat in 2008 illuminated the ways in which 
Mississippi state politics were both dependent on and diverged from national politics. 
Similarly, historical context impacted present-day geographical context and 
political/economic context. Also, these nodes overlapped with other levels; for example, 
racism, located in the macrosystem level of my coding structure, overlapped with all 
three context sub-nodes. In order to establish relevant context, first, I present themes that 
ran across both time points and then discuss the contextual changes between the two time 
points, relating these data back to CBO operation on the Gulf Coast, beginning with 
historical context.  
History of racism/segregation. One of the most common themes throughout all 
of the interviews concerned racism, and this theme often overlapped with historical 
context. In fact, forty-three percent (43%) of historical context references were also 
coded as racism. Of course, “racism” can refer to many different discriminatory 
behaviors, attitudes, and practices, which are all important, but I am interested in the 
references in which racism and historical context overlap. Throughout the interviews, 
leaders emphasized that Mississippi’s history of racism4 was relevant to the Coast’s 
recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Analysis highlighted two themes that describe the ways 
in which a history of racism impacted the Coast. These themes include outsiders’ 
perception of racism and the effects of racism. In other words, Mississippi’s racial history 
																																																								
4 Interviewees did not elaborate on specific details of this history. Often the interviewees assumed the 
interviewer was acquainted with Mississippi’s history. Several interviewees did mention the history of 
segregation but only vaguely. Therefore, this study analyzes perceptions (and perceptions of perceptions) 
and not actual historical events.  
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led to an outsider perception of racism as well as to institutionalized racism that had 
impacts for CBOs and the community. 
History of Racism CBO Effects 
Outsiders’ 
perceptions 
Difficulty retaining and recruiting staff; decreased 
funds from national foundations; emotional distress 
 
Effects of 
history of 
racism 
 
Segregation led to discriminatory practices in recovery; 
CBOs struggle to fill service gaps for those minorities 
left out of recovery. 
  
Table 3. History of Racism Effects on CBOs 
Perception of racism. One of the more common themes that emerged under 
historical context dealt with how Mississippi’s history affected outsiders’ perceptions of 
the state and how these perceptions impacted CBOs. For example, CBO leaders felt that 
outsiders – including national funding foundations, international and national nonprofits, 
and even individuals professionals and volunteers – perceived Mississippi to be 
“backwards,” “racist,” and “uneducated.” Interviewees blamed these perceptions on 
Mississippi’s history of racism and the state government’s devaluing of public education, 
social services, and healthcare. Regardless of the current state of racism on the Coast 
(many interviewees asserted that the Coast was “less racist” and “more educated” than 
the rest of the state), the perceived impact of this public perception loomed large in the 
interviews. Interviewees emphasized that these perceptions had real-world consequences 
on present-day Mississippi Gulf Coast CBOs by limiting access to funding and 
discouraging recruitment of professional staff. The history of Mississippi both in terms of 
racism and its reputation for its low national rankings in healthcare and education made it 
difficult for organizations to retain employers and to recruit employers from out-of-state. 
For example, one community health center executive director explained:  
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It’s very difficult for us and everyone else down here, to recruit. When you say 
Mississippi, that takes about half of them out right there because they’ve heard for 
years about Mississippi being number one or number fifty, whatever it is you 
want to talk about. So that stops about half of them, and then you get to coastal 
Mississippi, and they think of hurricanes. Then you have a very small pool to 
recruit from that want to come down here. Then the ones here, as I mentioned the 
mental health and all these other issues, we have trouble retaining staff.  
- Community Health CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
Given that CBOs increasingly must rely on external support and outside expertise to be 
sustainable, this finding is troubling. Additionally, this quote, in particular, illustrated the 
intersection of geographic location with historical context. In this case, they intersected to 
produce negative perceptions of the Coast as a geographically vulnerable location still 
plagued by racism. However, many interviewees pointed out that once outsiders visited 
the Coast, they found their perceptions inaccurate and often chose to stay.    
Interviewees explained that Mississippi’s history also affected how large funding 
organizations decided to allocate their funds. For example, one national funding 
organization refused to fund any organizations that existed prior to Katrina. They 
reasoned that pre-Katrina CBOs had been unable to respond successfully to racism and 
therefore, were ineffective at best and “part of the problem” at worst. Not only did this 
punitive response restrict access to much-needed funds for CBOs who were well 
established and well positioned to help the community, but it also caused emotional 
distress for leaders already experiencing burnout and mental health issues (Weber & 
Messias, 2011). As one CBO leader put it in 2007:   
…we were shut out of any funding from these major funders. They won’t even, 
because we’re, you know – what they’re really focused on is structural racism. 
Well, that’s what our organization is about. As a matter of fact, that’s what we’re 
doing. We’re breaking down these barriers. I mean, you know? So it’s been very 
difficult. I have cried actually nights about this because to sit in these meetings 
and on the [CBO] board and have [International Organization] and [National 
Funding Organization] come and tell us we’re not aware of structural racism, and 
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we must have been part of the problem since things were so bad before, sit there. 
It’s embarrassing. It’s really hurtful.  
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007 
 
This organization was having the same problem in 2013 with different funding 
organizations, showing the persistence of this mentality over time and the demoralizing 
effect it had on CBO leaders.  
You had those large – we saw a lot of money go to brand new nonprofits because 
the assumption was those of us who had been around and had achieved some 
really good things, that we were racist, and we had not been successful in the past.  
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
 
Outsiders’ assumptions based on Mississippi’s racial history continued to have harmful 
impacts throughout STR and LTR, presenting problems for CBOs trying to recruit 
outside professionals and secure external funding. 
Effects of racism. CBO leaders noted that Mississippi’s history of racism 
impacted more than just outsiders’ perceptions – it had present-day impacts on the 
Coastal communities. Interviewees noted that the Coast was still very segregated. 
Interviewees explained that African Americans and White people continued to occupy 
different spaces in the community, allowing for the inequitable distribution of resources 
and discriminatory practices along these lines. For instance, one of the themes that 
emerged during coding was the perception that the (predominantly white) Biloxi 
government was consistently disinvesting in historically African American communities, 
like East Biloxi. An often-cited example included the closing of a high performing East 
Biloxi school. In 2010, the Biloxi School Board, facing decreased enrollment citywide, 
decided to close several of its schools. One of the schools it chose to close was Nichols 
Elementary School, the highest performing school in the state that had just been rebuilt 
and equipped with new technology (MCJ, 2016). Public perception on the Coast was that 
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this decision was racially motivated. Nichols was 90% minority and located in a 
predominantly Black community. Of the schools chosen to stay open: Jefferson Davis, a 
school built in the 1950s and named for a confederate general (Brown, 2010). One 
community leader questioned why the board chose to close Nichols, a newly renovated 
school, instead of one of the other older schools, feeling that it was because white parents 
did not want their children to attend school in a historically black community: 
Now, you gonna take the school that cost you $25 million, brand new school that’s, 
wired for computers, all the new technology, and you're going keep a school open 
down there that's been built in 1950 where you got trailers on it. That didn't make 
no sense…all that [closing Nichols] was to keep the white kids out of the black 
community. “I would rather send my child to an old 1950's school in a white 
community than to send them to a state-of-the-art school that's in a predominantly 
black community.” 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013 
Since the school’s closing, the community has organized a grassroots campaign to 
advocate for reopening the school, which was seen as the pride of the East Biloxi 
community. This example is one of many ongoing racial struggles in the community.  
 Mississippi’s racial history also intersected with geographic context in that 
segregation’s lingering effects impacted where people lived and what type of damage 
they were likely to experience from the storm as well as what type of assistance they 
were likely to receive. For instance, one of the economic development projects funded 
with recovery funds was the development of the Port of Gulfport, which involved 
building a road slated to cut through wetlands and an African American community. One 
CBO leader explained that the burden from this project would be disproportionately 
borne by African American communities: 
And there’s also an environmental justice dimension to it in that the Port would be 
connected to the interstate highway system through an expressway that originally 
was proposed to divide a majority African-American community and would cause 
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flooding problems and air pollution problems, and so, we’ve fought that, and at 
this point, the permit for that highway – that expressway – has been pulled, and it 
is under reevaluation.  
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
Therefore, both disaster and its recovery played out along geographic lines that were 
racialized. Another example raised by interviewees was the state’s initial decision to 
provide assistance only to homeowners with insurance who had received storm surge 
damage, the type of damage that was most likely received by wealthy white landowners 
who could afford to live on the oceanfront. Renters and homeowners without insurance 
who received wind damage were left out of initial recovery assistance. The latter group 
most often included low-income African Americans as explained by one advocate:    
The State of Mississippi chose only to provide Homeowner Assistance Grants to 
people who had storm surge damage and not to people who just had hurricane wind 
damage. Well, hurricane is both wind and storm water, and we said that was unfair 
and wrong, and Louisiana wasn't doing that, and so, nor should Mississippi. Besides 
which, the way that the Gulf Coast was laid out with a rail bed that was laid down 
in the 19th century, and that rail bed helped to produce sort of a racially segregated 
pattern of settlement that persisted on up to the 21st century. If you were on the 
south side of the tracks, the White side of the tracks, you were going get storm 
surge damage, but the rail bed would hold back the storm surge, and if you were on 
the north side of the tracks, just a few blocks away from the shore, it would be 
majority Black communities, and they would get nothing. I said, “We can't allow 
that to happen.”  
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
A review of MDA documents revealed that the state did indeed prioritize homeowners 
with insurance who had experienced storm surge (MDA, 2006b). Throughout the 
recovery process, renters continued to be the most neglected group. Renters did not 
receive state assistance until 2014, almost ten years after the storm, and service providers 
agreed that it was too little too late (MDA, 2010; Robertson, 2010). CBOs were left to fill 
in the gaps for low-income, often minority, individuals who did not qualify for recovery 
assistance, usually without any additional resources to do so.  
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While many CBO leaders denied the presence of overt, personal racism, all 
interviewees emphasized the impact of a history of racism – in the form of outsiders’ 
perceptions of Mississippi and the lingering effects of segregation – on individuals, 
communities, and CBOs on the Coast. Of course, some interviewees did point to overt 
racism, most of which they identified at an institutional (exosystem) level. The 
interviewee below explained that the history of racism in Mississippi continues to be 
ongoing in the present, though it looks different than it did in the past: 
Yeah, well down here, of course everybody knows the history of 
Mississippi.  And unfortunately that’s a bad label that’s stuck and there’s many 
people who vocalize it openly that there’s still that mentality within that they 
don’t want to address the issue – they try to keep it hidden – racism. They no 
longer wear the white hoods and sheets – they wear now ties and white shirts.  
- Latino Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2007  
 
According to interviewees, Mississippi’s history of racism continued to play out 
implicitly and explicitly in the uneven experience of disaster and recovery, and this 
uneven recovery presented certain challenges for CBOs who had to fill in the gaps for 
minority groups left out of recovery assistance.   
Political/Economic context. In addition to historical context, the political and 
economic context of the MSGC, had implications for CBOs working in LTR. This 
context both presented challenges and provided certain benefits to communities and 
CBOs. The differentiation of national, state, and local context political/economic contexts 
is helpful in understanding the context CBOs navigated in LTR. While CBO leaders 
spoke most often about local and state context, they still emphasized the impact of the 
national political and economic context on the local context, CBO operations, and 
recovery generally. Though presented in separate sections, national, state, and local 
political and economic context codes overlapped with each other and with other 
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contextual codes (i.e., geographic and historical), which I will demonstrate as I discuss 
each level.  
Political/Economic Context CBO Effects 
National   
 Instability of 
economy 
Decrease in public/private funds; Uncertainty for 
future sustainability 
State   
 Plantation Economy Lack of voice in recovery processes; difficult to 
navigate power dynamics 
 Gov. Barbour’s 
power 
No oversight on recovery $; inability to direct 
recovery $ to those who most needed it; large sums of 
federal funds to MS 
 Business-friendly 
economy 
Less money available for programs to benefit CBOs’ 
communities 
 Insular culture Distrust of outsiders supported “good ole boy” power 
dynamic that was difficult for CBOs to navigate 
Local   
 Business interests 
privileged  
Less funds available for CBO projects to benefit the 
community; economic projects actually hurt CBOs’ 
communities 
 Illusion of Voice Led to frustration, disillusionment, and lack of trust; 
wasted valuable time 
 Recovery structured 
to benefit protected 
classes 
Challenge to enforce accountability for recovery $ and 
to ensure it benefitted those in need 
   
Table 4. Political/Economic Context Effects on CBOs  
 National level. Interviewees in both 2007 and 2013 interviews showed an 
awareness of the impact of the national economic and political climate on the community 
and their work. For the most part, interviewees explained the ways in which this context 
presented challenges for their organizations. The instability of the overall national 
economy – particularly, the Great Recession and the housing market crisis – led to a 
decrease in available federal and private funds for CBOs and created a general 
uncertainty about the future. CBO leaders noted that the recession and the federal 
government greatly impacted their work and communities:  
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It’s a double whammy. It’s the whammy of Katrina plus the national economic 
scene. You know, it’s just not Katrina. Now it’s the national economics.   
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007 
 
And in part it’s a recognition that, with the recession and the pull back in 
government funding, it’s very difficult to have enough scale in what we’re doing to 
make a difference in our community.  
- CBO, Director of Initiatives, White female, 2013 
 
This uncertainty was troubling for many CBOs given their belief that their sustainability 
depended, in part, on federal policies and national economic stability. When asked about 
the future of their organization and community, CBO leaders in both time periods pointed 
to national government as the deciding factor: 
The federal government – in terms of whoever that President’s gonna be the next 
time we elect one, how he affects the economy in terms of getting money rolling 
again.  
–Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2007 
 
I think the biggest wild card in all of this is Congress. And if more money is pulled 
out of social services, it, and it won’t just be the coast, I just think the, all of us will 
be in really bad shape.  
-CBO, Director of Initiatives, White female, 2013 
 
Though the ways in which the national context affected CBOs’ work on the Coast 
differed slightly between 2007/8 and 2013/4, the commonality was an awareness of the 
pervasive impact of a national context and that this context was mostly categorized by 
uncertainty.  
State level. CBO leaders also acknowledged the impact of the state political and 
economic context on their CBOs. However, they did not see this context as uncertain but 
as more fixed, following previously set historical patterns. These patterns could be traced 
to Mississippi’s history of what one interviewee called a “plantation economy”. 
Interviewees described the wealth in Mississippi as concentrated in the hands of a few 
and explained that these few were the people who made the decisions. Recognizing the 
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intersection of history and political/economic context, one interviewee argued that this 
“oligarchy of wealth” was prevalent even at the local level on the Gulf Coast: 
… but I do believe that we live in the ongoing plantation economy in Mississippi in 
the sense we have an oligarchy of wealth. They would have been landowners 
previously, but now they’re corporate business owners that pretty much hold sway. 
And you can see this here on the Gulf Coast. Who is it that’s the head of 
Mississippi and the president of the bank? These are the important people. The only 
important people are the movers and the shakers or the people that have money. 
And that’s basically the decision makers…That’s what kind of place we have here: 
those who make decisions and the rest of us. Well, there’s a whole bunch of rest of 
us in Mississippi. There’s a huge population of the rest of us. 
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007 
 
These “movers and the shakers,” who had little ties to the community and were often 
located in Jackson were the decision-makers directing the recovery process. Interviewees 
repeatedly noted that the Coast was less politically conservative than the rest of the state 
and had different ideas for recovery for their communities.  
We do not have as much presence or as much, for lack of a better word, political 
clout, even though that’s not really the right word, as the rest of the state.  You 
know, the three coastal counties have always been treated a little bit different, even 
though the bulk of the tax base comes from either business, you know, from – 
mainly from businesses in the three coastal counties.  The northern part of the state 
has always had more of a say-so in how the state as a whole is run.  
- Community development financial lender, White female, 2007 
 
CBOs felt that the Coast had little voice to impact policy decisions that affected them 
because decision-making was concentrated into the hands of a few “movers and shakers”.  
According to interviewees, the most powerful of these “movers and shakers” was 
Governor Haley Barbour. Without fail, every interviewee in both studies indicated that 
Governor Barbour was the most powerful voice in recovery. In fact, one of the most 
common themes throughout the interviews was Governor Barbour’s power (249 
references across 19 interviews were generated for the overlap of “Power” and “Governor 
Barbour”). As former chair of the Republican Party, he had strong connections to 
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President Bush, the sitting president during Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, the president 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time was Mississippi Republican senator, 
Thad Cochran. Therefore, Governor Barbour was well positioned to secure billions of 
federal funds for Mississippi. Notably, Barbour received $5.481 billion in Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds. CDBG funds are federal funds allocated by 
HUD for community projects and federal requirements stipulate that 70% of these funds 
go to projects that benefit low-to-moderate income individuals (Housing and Community 
Development Act, 1974). However, Governor Barbour received waivers on these 
stipulations so that he and his (self-appointed) recovery commission could distribute 
funds, however they wished with no federal or state oversight or requirements (Waivers, 
2006; Weber, 2014; & Weber & Smith, 2013) Therefore, the governor had free reign to 
direct recovery money and, subsequently, the recovery process however he pleased. CBO 
leaders expressed awe of his ability to exercise his power so efficiently. As one legal aid 
coordinator put it:  
And our governor is very – he’s used to throwing his weight around. That’s how he 
became successful. He sends information very well. He does great PR, you know? I – 
we wish that we could learn how he does it so we could replicate it.”   
-Advocacy CBO, Legal Aid Coordinator, White female, 2007  
 
They were also appreciative of his ability to garner so much money for Mississippi 
recovery. In a way, his power was viewed as a double-edged sword. 
In addition to appreciating his pull in Washington and his power at the state and 
national level, CBOs leaders were frustrated by the lack of accountability for the billions 
of recovery dollars flowing into Mississippi, as the following quote explained:  
And also another thing we realized in this disaster is that the federal government needs 
to have in – a governor should not have full responsibility for the spending of the 
money to say what he wants done with it. There needs to be oversight based on the 
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needs that are there, and the communities need to be involved because they [the federal 
government] basically gave Haley Barbour, they just waived everything. They waived 
every rule, every EPA. Everything was waived, and, virtually your governor has free 
will to do everything and citizens have absolutely no input whatsoever… they need to 
give the legislature some kind of oversight so the governor just doesn’t have full 
empiric [sic] powers. 
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007 
 
This unbridled power made tracking recovery money difficult and made it harder for 
CBOs to advocate for community interests in the recovery process. The same interviewee 
explained: 
Advocacy would be like, happens frequently, you send a letter to one of your 
congresspersons about something, and ask them to please change their position. 
And you get a letter back, “thank you for being on their side.” It’s almost like 
people don’t count because they have money behind them to do whatever they 
want.”  
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013 
 
 
Because CBOs and their constituents lacked money and power, they were unable to direct 
recovery in a way that benefited the community. Given Governor Barbour’s power to get 
waivers on recovery funds coupled with the conservative state’s “small government” 
mentality, ironically, the Governor and his commission were able to have free reign in 
allocating disaster funds without input from state legislators or community members. 
Unfortunately, as interviewees pointed out, these funds benefitted people who were 
already in power and not those people who were in the most need. 
Governor Barbour and his appointed recovery commission drove the recovery 
process, which often reflected the interests of business and industry and not the 
communities in recovery. Many interviewees were adamant that they were not against 
economic development. In fact, they insisted economic development was important for a 
full recovery on the Coast. For instance, interviewees noted that the Mississippi is a 
“right-to-work” state and very “business friendly,” attracting developers and certain types 
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of businesses, which they hoped would be positive for job and economic development on 
the Coast. However, leaders also pointed out that outsiders are hesitant to invest in a state 
that does not invest in public health and education. Additionally, they argued that too 
often, business interests and economic development projects trumped the needs and best 
interests of the community. When asked about the progress of recovery in 2007, one 
leader answered:  
So the answer to your question is that if what you're looking at is, you know, how 
quickly are we rebuilding this as a resort community, you might say we're doing 
pretty well.  But if you're looking from the perspective of how are we doing at 
rebuilding communities and creating a place for people who have always lived 
along the Gulf Coast to recreate their homes and communities, I'd say we're not 
doing so well.  
– Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007 
 
Additionally, many CBO leaders questioned if these business-friendly policies were 
really in the best interest of economic development or job creation. Instead they felt these 
policies were actually schemes designed to put more money into the hands of business 
owners.  
People think Mississippi is “business-friendly.” You know, that's sort of a 
mockable – business means – the real word there is they’re saying, “business-
owner-friendly.” You're not a friendly business to the employee, you're basically 
– and no owner has any business that they don't have employees; so, it’s a, you 
know, it’s a symbiotic relationship, but they treat it likes it's not.  
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
CBOs felt that not only did business interests trump community interests but also 
business interests were not concerned with economic development on the Coast as much 
as they were concerned with generating corporate profits. 
In addition to noting Mississippi’s conservative political context and business-
friendly economic context, interviewees also noted that Mississippi was an “insular 
culture”. This inward focus was categorized by a distrust of outsiders and an insistence 
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on the state’s independence, particularly from the federal government. While many 
interviewees noted that the Coast was much more open to outsiders and “new ideas,” they 
explained that the majority of the state – particularly, the state government – was not. 
This mentality had implications for recovery funding and planning. For instance, this 
insular culture supported the “good ‘ole boy” power dynamic that was difficult for CBOs 
to navigate as one leader described: 
It's still a very insular society. It's still run by frat guys that met at Ole Miss Law 
School, and belonged to the same fraternity and all that. There's pretty much still 
a very insular clubbiness to it all.  
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
This good ‘ole boy network and mistrust of outsiders was reminiscent of state’s rights 
rhetoric and, not surprisingly, impacted the ways in which the state government viewed 
and interacted with the federal government. CBOs noted that the state mistrusted the 
federal government and often opposed even beneficial legislation (e.g., accepting 
stimulus dollars). The following interviewee noted the irony in distancing the state from 
the federal government, while also accepting billions of federal dollars. 
Anything that the federal government might want that’s positive, we’re [state 
government] automatically against it. And that is everything. Even a republican 
insurance commissioner set up the health exchanges, and Bryant overwrote it. 
“We’re not gonna have those.” So, no matter which way you go, you have the same 
intransigence...[The Tea Partiers] are getting just what they wanted, and it’s, the 
whole thing is growing just anti-establishment that the government has no role in 
anything, but I have to laugh at Mississippi more, over 70% of our money comes 
from the federal government [laughter]. 
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013 
Interviewees explained that while the Coast did not express these views as strongly, the 
state government tightly controlled federal funds into the state (whether or not they were let 
in and where they were allocated) without considering the interests of the Coast, who felt 
like outsiders to the rest of the state.  
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Local level. The state political and economic context necessarily impacted the 
local context. For instance, the state’s privileging of business interests over community 
played out at the local level. Many of the economic development projects not only took 
away money from other projects that could meet community needs, but they also directly 
harmed certain communities, particularly African American communities. Therefore, 
business interests were racialized as evident in the blatant disregard of East Biloxi and 
Moss Point (a predominantly African American town) in the recovery process. 
It’s [the lack of recovery in Moss Point] unfortunate but I think [it’s] because it is 
predominantly an African-American community. I’d like to be able to say that I 
don’t think that had some influence, but I genuinely believe it did when it came to 
decisions with state government. When it came to, you know, “Do we put $15 
million into a new baseball stadium in Biloxi or do we put $15 million into water 
and sewer systems in Moss Point?” Biloxi got the baseball stadium, got a baseball 
stadium.   
-Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
Many interviewees saw this privileging of business interests as more insidious, feeling 
that economic development was a smokescreen for projects designed merely to benefit 
business elites, even seeing this trend with the local government. 
I think it’s the worst thing in the world in terms of – it really created just – it 
makes me mad that our state government would take advantage of people who 
really need this money to make it possible for other people to get rich.  This 
money – it’s basically the same in most situations, it’s nothing new. The 
government gives money for programs to help needy people.  And the state and 
local government takes it and uses it to feed the pockets of the rich.   
- CBO Advocacy, Executive Director, African American male, 2007 
 
Seeing business continually trump community interests became even more frustrating as 
the recovery process continued. Several interviewees noted that BP Restore Act monies 
were slated to go directly to the governor and that, once again, the state’s goal was to 
spend the money on economic development and tourism, while the community wanted to 
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invest in restoring fisheries and wetlands. CBOs were “disheartened” to see this happen 
again, as one leader put it: “Same song. Second verse.” 
This frustration and disillusionment was amplified by the fact that CBOs had been 
voicing their concerns for years with no effect. In the beginning of the recovery process, 
the local governments involved CBO leaders and community members in public planning 
meetings designed to elicit community input into city planning. However, as STR 
transitioned to LTR, the interests of the community were consistently ignored: 
And I think that one of the things that was really, really, really frustrating for 
everybody, and you can really see it now, is that time and time and time again 
people were invited to come to some kind of a public meeting to give their input 
about what unmet recovery needs were or how the redevelopment of the coast 
needed to happen and the recommendations that had to do with affordable 
housing with, like, affordable childcare. All of these recommendations that were 
not related to this resort development agenda were just, you got tired of going to 
meetings where you said things over and over again, and they were over and over 
again ignored. 
-Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007 
 
This “illusion of voice” caused frustration and disillusionment with the government while 
also taking up valuable time. The same interviewee gave an assessment of this process 6 
years later seeing it as part of a larger tradition of the general recovery process: 
And yet, I stand back and look at the kind of big picture of things, the Port, the 
recovery money, the [Business CBO funneling recovery dollars], I mean, all these 
things that happened, and I see a real layer of decisions that happened somewhere 
other than at the local community level. Because there was such a disconnect 
between the infinite number of occasions where people were asked to come and 
give input about recovery and what they needed and what they wanted and how 
they wanted it to look, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah. None of that 
ever happened. None of the recommendations were adopted. None of the advice 
was taken. None of the input guided what actually finally did happen. It was the 
same large hands of the money players that ultimately made what happened 
happen. And as I say, a lot of it was not done in a way that was transparent to 
people. And it is unfortunately a very common occurrence that the proceedings of 
a public hearing don’t matter to the ultimate actions that are taken . . .  
-Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
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Perhaps because of this illusion of voice, many interviewees showed a distrust of 
government in general, a sentiment encapsulated by this volunteer advocate’s assessment 
of the Coast’s 2007 political/economic context: “A country that has forgotten, with a 
governor who doesn’t give a shit, in the poorest state in the nation” (Advocacy CBO, 
Volunteer Advocate, White female, 2007).  
Most CBO leaders explained the local context in a way that showed sophisticated 
recognition of the ways in which historical, geographical, political, and economic factors 
intersected to create a context that privileged certain groups over others – particularly 
along lines of race and class: 
Looking at these demographics and knowing your community – you know it when 
you've lived here all your life – you see that it has been pushed out the recovery 
process (our response to that disaster, not the natural disaster itself)…obviously, 
natural disaster coupled with social patterns created lots of issues. But if you look at 
our response of how we as a state and as a country, what we've done down here in 
South Mississippi is created an environment much more conducive for businesses 
and corporations to thrive right now without the vision of a community in mind, 
without the vision of neighborhoods, without the vision of who it is that is going to 
be employed by those businesses and corporations. By looking at what life would 
be like for those employees, as to where they would live, as to the quality of that 
housing, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, they tend to be the ones that have, historically, 
belonged to protected classes.  
– CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007 
 
In other words, CBOs were aware that they worked within a context that consistently 
privileged the “protected classes” – the “movers and the shakers” – who held the wealth 
and made the decisions. Interviewees emphasized that these relations were not new but 
had existed for years and that those in power had erected structures to ensure that these 
power relations stayed in place. One of these structures or strategies was the illusion of 
voice: 
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Whether you’re talking about a nuclear power plant or a, a state public policy plan 
or a BP Restore Act strategy or a hurricane recovery strategy, you know, it’s 
unfortunate that that is a dynamic that plays itself out over and over again. And 
the people who are in charge of the end game have gotten very good at making 
people feel like a public hearing process matters, and, and installing a pretty 
impermeable barrier between the public hearing process and what decisions 
finally get made. 
 – Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
 
These structures also ensured that powerful decision-makers were immune from censure 
and accountability.  
And basically, the political powers “to be” have always dictated what happens.  In 
regards to how you cry out for these folks, politics still speaks louder than the needs 
of the people. And that’s all this is, is politicking. Anybody else would have been 
thrown in jail if they misuse funds like they’re doin’ – like this governor’s doin’ 
here in the state of Mississippi.  
– Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2007 
 
Unfortunately, interviewees seemed to view these relations as more fixed than those at the 
national level. However, they continued to advocate for their communities nonetheless, 
finding creative and innovative ways to disrupt power structures.  
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Changes in Context  
Eco-Level Theme 
 
 
Subthemes  
 
A 
 
 
 
 
B 
Interview Coverage 
# References #Interviewees 
2007 2013 2007 2013 
Context Historical    23 18 9 9 
 Political/Economic    80 84 14 15 
  National  19 39 10 13 
   Political 10 33 7 13 
   Economic 13 17 7 10 
  State  36 35 11 11 
  Local   21 27 10 8 
   NIMBY-ism 5 0 3 0 
 Geographical/Physical   3 12 2 5 
Macrosystem Racism   51 36 15 10 
Context x 
Macrosystem 
Historical context x 
racism 
  9 8 6 5 
Context x 
CBO Level  
National Pol/Eco 
Context x CBO 
Challenges 
  0 15 0 8 
        
Table 5. Comparison of Interview Coverage for “Context” Codes from 2007/8 to 2013/4 
 
Many of these contextual issues held over time; however, some changes in 
context were apparent, and these changes had implications for CBOs (See Table 6). The 
relevance of these challenges increased in 2013. When running a query looking at overlap 
between national political climate and CBO challenges, all of the 8 sources and 15 
references were mentioned by 2013 interviewees. In fact, 44% of 2013 interviewees 
discussed national political climate and CBO challenges as overlapping. For example, 
while 2007 interviewees expressed more concern about the economic state of the country, 
2013 interviewees placed more of an emphasis on the national political scene – 
particularly the rise of the Tea Party and the government shutdown – and the implications 
these politics had for the economy and the general attitude of the public. One reason for 
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this increase may be because the shutdown was ongoing while we were conducting 
interviews in 2013, and several CBOs were directly affected because they relied on 
federal funds. One interviewee spoke of a delay in an application for a federal loan. 
Perhaps most pervasive, however, was the notion that the shutdown was indicative of the 
larger national climate categorized by hostility toward social services and poor people:  
But part of the problem is not unique to the Coast. It really is a question that I 
think about in terms of the whole country right now. Just looking at the 
government shutdown and the sequestration cuts and the Paul Ryan budget, you 
know? I mean, this whole direction of people’s behavior in public life recently 
seems to be moving in a direction increasingly without any indication that people 
have remembered how to be empathetic. I just feel like we have no capacity for 
empathy anymore… this mean-spirited, selfish, “me only,” “only if it’s gonna 
benefit me or mine”…I mean, it’s really kind of . . . a challenge nationwide to 
what I was describing early on as Mississippi-specific. So, here we are, you know, 
relishing in our identity as a Christian nation, where this inability to be empathetic 
is also ruling our politics.  
- Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
 
Interviewees also indicated that national politics was having real effects at the 
local level. For instance, the government shutdown and cutting social services had the 
most impact on those groups that were already disadvantaged. As the below interviewee 
pointed out, these national issues also affect CBO services by adding a new constituency 
that needed entirely new types of services. 
This national economic problem that we’re having recently with the shutdown, 
government shutdowns of government programs, assistance, these furloughs – not 
only those in furloughs – are impacting the average income to where now it’s 
putting them in a lower income bracket with not any services, but now these 
services that would usually be given to those that are economically challenged – 
now you got another economic challenged community, but now that these services 
are being shutdown, now where you are. You’re making the poor poorer. You’re 
making – government’s making people starve. Well, you got – You’re in a no-win 
situation with that. So again, economic situation around here is the biggest problem. 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2013 
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The sentiment at the national level was perceived as somewhat hostile to the very 
purposes that these CBOs were trying to accomplish, while also leading to funding cuts 
and shutdowns that were damaging for their mission and the people that they served, 
even adding additional people to their constituency.  
In addition to shutdown and cuts to social services, interviewees were highly 
concerned with the effect that national policies had on their communities and 
organizations. Almost every interviewee mentioned insurance as the biggest challenge for 
the community going forward. During the 2013 interviews, Congress had just passed the 
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, which aimed to raise insurance 
rates in flood zones by 25% each year for five years until the rates reflected the full risk 
(2012). Many people on the Mississippi Gulf Coast were worried that they would not be 
able to afford flood insurance on their homes. Local housing CBOs were concerned that 
low-income clients in their housing programs would no longer be able to afford the 
insurance on their homes – particularly elderly residents on a fixed income. Of particular 
concern to everyone was the fact that residents could not prepare financially for these 
increases because they had no idea how much their rates could increase as the act 
removed all limits on rate increases.5 The following CBO leader felt that the Biggert-
Waters Act was a personal affront to Mississippi as she explained when asked about the 
biggest challenge for her community: 
 
 
 																																																								
5 In 2014, the act was amended to put caps on these insurance rates and to allow some “grandfathering,” but 
at the time of the interviews, this amendment had not yet occurred. See congressional bill H.R. 2199. 
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Everybody's going to tell you the same thing. It’s flood insurance. You know, if 
they truly allow Mississippi to bear the burden of trying to make the national flood 
insurance whole until the other states have completed their remapping and 
rezoning, it's going to devastate the Gulf Coast area. It's [going] to desolate it. I 
mean, there's just no other way around it, and it's just going to have a huge 
economic [effects] that the area will never recover from.  
- Lender/Educational CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
Therefore, certain policies like the Biggert-Waters Act added much more uncertainty to 
the LTR on the MSGC as well as led CBO leaders and MSGC residents to feel 
disregarded and even “used” by the federal government.   
In addition to the uncertainty presented by the Biggert-Waters Act, one of the 
biggest changes politically for the Coast was the change in administrations – both at the 
national level and state level. Of course, changes in the presidential administration from a 
Republican administration to a Democratic administration had implications for the 
largely Republican state. As one interviewee put it: “they not gonna get that kind of 
money from the federal government again like they did after Katrina. That will never 
happen again. Because, you'll never have the relationship from a former Republican leader, 
which is Governor Barbour, talking to a former Republican president to get that kind of 
money or pull anything like that off” (Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African 
American male, 2013). CBO leaders felt that the MSGC had lost some of its power at the 
national level. At the state level, despite the frustrations with Governor Barbour’s 
unrestricted power and business interests, the change in governors was not necessarily 
seen as a positive. By 2013/4, CBO leaders had learned how to navigate state power 
dynamics. With the new governor, Governor Phil Bryant, new power dynamics emerged 
that had to be learned. One CBO explained how he had learned to work with Barbour but 
was unsure of the ways in which power at the state level was currently operating: 
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Governor Barbour I actually found to be, for as conservative a pillar as he was 
nationally, I also found him to be extremely pragmatic in that if you could provide 
him with evidence-based data that validated a need or a request, he didn’t have a 
problem exercising personal or political capital if it was something that was 
verifiable and justifiable. I don’t get that at all with the current administration…at 
all...And I think the power dynamics within the state politics, you know Governor 
Barbour, nobody was going to go up against Governor Barbour. He had his way on 
everything or whatever he said went. If you could get him to agree with you on 
something, nobody was going to oppose him or put up any real opposition, where 
that’s not the case anymore. There are multiple factions of power that aren’t 
necessarily in alignment with each other. 
- Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
Another leader also emphasized the new governor’s lack of power and the conflict within 
his administration, all of which led to an uncertainty of how to navigate these new power 
dynamics:  
We had such a strong governor in Haley Barbour. Master politician. Clearly got 
everything he wanted. The new governor, it’s not as apparent yet. As a matter of 
fact, there’s so much squabbling between the governor and the lieutenant 
governor and some of the others, it’s sort of difficult to get your read 
on…Mississippi has always been a weak governor state.…Haley Barbour 
changed that. He got what he wanted…Whether other people will be able to use 
the power as he did, I don’t know. But the lieutenant governor is the chair of the 
State Senate. So, if the governor and lieutenant governor aren’t singing off the 
same sheet of music, the legislature can be more powerful. So, I don’t know yet 
how that’s going to play out. 
- CBO, Director of Initiatives, White female, 2013 
New administrations meant new power dynamics to learn as well as meant a less 
powerful political presence in Washington. 
Interviewees indicated that the rise of the Tea Party at the state level also had 
implications for CBOs. They described Tea Party leaders fighting to cut government 
funding to necessary social services that were often provided by CBOs. Tea Party 
officials also refused to work with CBO leaders to reach a compromise, making local 
advocacy difficult. In fact, sometimes Tea Party leaders worked directly against CBOs. 
For instance, the Tea Party movement in Mississippi attempted to thwart the efforts of one 
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of the largest new collaborations on the Gulf Coast that were working toward sustainable 
communities. Almost all CBO interviewees were a part of this collaborative and were 
working with local government agencies to produce better communities in terms of 
housing, transportation, jobs, education, and food access. One CBO leader explained the 
difficulty of working cross-sector with government when many of the government officials 
at the state and local level espoused Tea Party ideals: 
Governor Bryant himself at various points has either flirted with or openly 
embraced the Tea Party. One example is that he has aligned himself, or at least 
“liked” them on their Facebook page – the group which thinks that sustainable 
community planning, which is this effort by the federal government to reduce 
vehicle miles traveled and increase accessibility of homes to schools and to work, 
it’s some kind of UN takeover of America via zoning. That sounds preposterous for 
me to say that to you, but that’s literally what it is; it's called Anti-Agenda 21. So, 
you can go look up Agenda 21 in Mississippi on Facebook page, and Phil Bryant 
has “liked” it. And it's real. And it's crazy.  
 
This interviewee continued to explain that the rise of the local Tea Party movement has 
also had impact on outside investors: 
And it's crippling Mississippi because nobody wants to invest in a state where the 
educational system is going to get crippled by people who don't believe in there 
being an important role for government in doing public education, or any of the 
other public services. It's really sort of the antitheses of civil government.  
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
  
Interviewees explained that this local Tea Party movement impacted CBOs by 
obstructing policies that would benefit CBOs, discouraging outside investors, and by 
directly campaigning against CBOs’ efforts to work with government to benefit local 
communities. 
Despite these challenges, many of the contextual changes at the local level were 
beneficial to CBOs. One of these changes included the community’s increased openness 
to outsiders and new ideas. Increased contact with new people and ideas, as one 
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interviewee explained, disrupted this insular culture and led to an increase in advocacy 
and less mistrust toward outsiders:  
After Katrina, we had lots and lots of instances where people just simply stood up 
and said, “Yeah, I don't like the way this is being done.” Lots more people were 
organized in lots of different ways. Sometimes it was aimed at the federal 
government because of FEMA terms; sometimes it was aimed at the state 
government because of misplaced priorities in using disaster money, and sometimes 
it was aimed at local government over issues of where poor people could live or 
whether they would have to elevate their homes or any of a number of other 
things…and the other thing that happened is with all these volunteers from all over 
the country, Mississippians were rubbing up against the shoulders of people who 
didn't think like that and had to be grateful for their support; so, they were having 
conversations with people who were politically out of the spectrum in which they 
operate. So, that was interesting. It changed and enriched our society, I believe. And 
that was powerful.  
–Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
Interviewees suggested that the community was even more tolerant of outsiders within 
their own communities. For example, an analysis of 2013/4 interviews showed a decrease 
in community members expressing “NIMBY-ism” – “Not in my backyard” – sentiments. 
In 2007/8 NIMBY-ism was an often-cited problem mentioned by almost every 
interviewee, and CBOs listed NIMBY-ism as one of the biggest challenges that they 
faced in moving forward in recovery. Additionally, NIMBY-ism did not show up as 
much in 2013 interviews. For example, one Housing CBO leader in 2007/8 discussed 
having to adapt their CBO public relations policy to address public concerns over 
building houses for poor people. Another interviewee lamented the loss of a much-
needed elderly housing project. Despite the fact that the CBO had the money, the 
location, and the resources for the project, the community turned it down because they 
did not want “those kinds of people” in their neighborhood. The heartbreak of this leader 
is palpable as she explained the project:  
We got a piece of property, and we got a contract on it, and we had this beautiful 
plan that was done by volunteer architects. It was a beautiful layout. It was to be a 
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senior village. And we had this and lo and behold, the citizens were against it. The 
citizens went online and they found out that [a national nonprofit affiliated with the 
CBO] served persons with AIDS, they served drug addicts, they served people 
getting out of jail…Well, we went to meeting after meeting and I finally got at the 
city counsel meeting with all these folks and I said, “I am [affiliated with the 
nonprofit], and yes, it is true, we do serve persons with AIDs…In fact, we do work 
with people coming out of prison and we have wonderful programs of restitution, 
and we help people get in transitional housing. That is a wonderful program we 
have. And, in fact, we work with people who have drug problems and 
rehabilitation.” And I said, “And we actually work with the homeless even.”  I said, 
“But this is not what we’re doing here.  We’re trying to get elders into homes.” … 
But, of course, the whole program got turned down… they were worried about 
ruining the neighborhood, of course. The people [living on the lot] right now had an 
old Mardi Gras float that was disintegrating in their yard. So, you know, all of that 
was just they didn’t want it, just didn’t want this elder housing, so that was a real 
disappointment.  It really broke our hearts because the elders need housing so 
badly. 
-Housing CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2007 
 
However, NIMBY-ism was not mentioned at all in 2013/4, even when asked directly 
about housing. It is possible that this increased contact with outsiders led to a decrease in 
insular culture and also led to decrease in prejudice toward outsider within.  
Another beneficial change included an increase in community organizing on the 
Gulf Coast. Interviewees in 2007 noted that it was difficult to organize at the grassroots 
level. However in 2013, almost all of the interviewees noted an increase in advocacy at 
the grassroots level. Analysis revealed that grassroots organizations were more prevalent 
and organized in 2013 and community involvement in general had increased. 
And, there has been a relatively anemic progressive protest for political base to 
challenge them. I think Katrina changed that. And, also along the way, 
[participating in community planning meetings] started to make people participate 
more frequently in challenging the wisdom of government decisions…And so, 
there's more and more skepticism about government, more government 
accountability demanded and more expectation about openness and transparency 
in the way government is conducted. I think that's, in some ways, accelerating 
some trends that were maybe, you know, in the beginning underway a little bit 
there. Uh, they've just been sharply accelerated, I think, by the storm. 
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
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Sparked by increased civil engagement after the storm, community members continued to 
be involved in local government processes.  
In addition to more openness to outsiders and increased advocacy, the Coast at the 
local level saw an increase in regional unification. For example, in 2007, the Coast was 
fragmented at both the government and CBO level. Leaders cited different and competing 
visions for the Coast as one of the areas of contention contributing to slow recovery.  
I think local jurisdictions need to come to the table; and they need to figure out 
what barriers they have put up as far as progress goes.  I think that there’s gonna 
have to be some pushing from the governor’s office, maybe, to get them to act 
and to realize that the lack of making decisions and lack of being willing to 
cooperate and work together is causing more harm than good. 
-Lending/Education CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007 
Additionally, competition among and between organizations was cited as an issue:  
There was a lot of skepticism and fear from the board, their individual respective 
boards, and people in the communities think that there's a lot of – rightly or 
wrongly, there's a lot of competition and the people on the coast feel very 
competitive and slighted if one community gets more resources than the other.   
-Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2007 
However, by 2013, the Coast had really developed more of a unified vision as different 
municipalities were working together to plan for the future of the Coast:   
I think the interaction between the local government is good and part of this 
regional planning work has brought a lot of that together in terms of bringing 
mayors together. I think there has been some, and certainly what we're trying to 
work toward is getting more kind of regional kind of decision making with the 
creation of a Regional Tourist Counsel, as well as, you know there’s other things 
that have happened. We worked a lot with the Regional Planning Commission, as 
well as the regional traffic and that's one of our partner's with the Sustainable 
Communities work. So, I think we're seeing more kind of regional cooperation, so 
I think locally things are getting better.  
-Housing CBO, Architect, White male, 2013 
 
Additionally, cross-sector collaborations between government and CBOs and 
collaborations between CBOs were more common. Though interviewees did not 
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explicitly mention that collaborations had increased, the number of codes for 
collaborations increased from 41 references to 113. These groups worked together to plan 
for the future of the community, to reduce duplicating work and services, and to apply for 
funding for their initiatives.  
The Plan for Opportunity, which is what we call this sustainable communities 
work, is…in fact, the list of partners on that is a page long. I mean it’s all these 
different advocacy groups, all these different…working with all the different 
cities. Anyway, we spend a whole lot of time in meetings, which is part of this 
work…and I think one of the things that we've gotten really well known for is our 
ability to kind of work well in collaboration. And it's something that I have come 
to really appreciate the kind of strain of partnerships and developing long-term 
partners. So, you're working with people…so, we have done projects repeatedly, 
you know, over and over again with some of the same organizations. We've just 
become sort of an extension of them in a sense.  
–Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
CBOs found these collaborations to be beneficial. As 2013 interviews showed, almost 
universal recognition that collaborations were a useful way to enact change in the 
community. Overall, 2013 interviews showed a Coast in 2013 was less fragmented and 
less insular.  
Finally, one of the major contributors to change in context on the Coast included 
the other disasters that had occurred in the interim. Almost all 2013 interviewees 
mentioned the impact of the combined effects of BP and the Great Recession on the 
Coast. Although interviewers asked questions about other hurricanes, like Isaac and 
Gustav, that had occurred, it was clear that the recession and the oil spill were perceived 
as the most impactful for the Coast’s LTR. In some ways, the Oil Spill was positive for 
CBOs because they brought in additional money to help fund new projects and helped 
fledgling post-Katrina CBOs refine their mission. One leader explained how BP helped 
one post-Katrina CBO: 
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The BP disaster, in some ways gave the organization another focus and again, it’s 
too bad that you link it to disaster, but that’s how it’s played out I think. They’ve 
tried to identify themselves as an organizer of populations in vulnerable 
communities. 
-Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
 
However, BP also had negative effects. It depressed the tourism and fishing industries as 
well as the housing market. Interviewees felt that the decrease in tourism and the housing 
market on the coast was influenced by the perception that all the beaches were covered in 
oil, despite the fact that the oil was not visible for long on the beaches. Of course, the oil 
spill made the most vulnerable groups even more vulnerable. The Vietnamese fishermen 
– an already low-income and marginalized group – were cited as the group most effected 
by the spill. While recognizing some of the benefits of the influx of new money, one 
interviewee was still hesitant to call it a silver lining for even CBOs because of its 
extreme negative effects and the possibility of the misuse of recovery funds:  
Well, yeah, I mean and it all depends on who is the beneficiary of the lining as to 
whether it’s silver or whether it’s black. And for a lot of people, they got knocked 
off their feet and they haven’t been able to get back up. And that’s in part, you 
know, if you were just getting it, getting up. We were just getting up and running 
when the recession hit. So, that double whammy has been, pretty profound and all 
this brew-ha-ha about the BP money and where is it going and who is it…when at 
the first meeting that they had about the BP money was [right] here. My boss 
stood up and said “Well, will you be expecting claims from [CBOs], will you be 
accepting claims? And he told her point blank “no”. In a room full of 400 people, 
“no”! And they backtracked some on that, but those claims are still 
processing…some non-profits have gotten some bits and pieces of money but 
nothing that commiserate with the resources that the social services had to put in 
to helping the people impacted by the storm. 
- CBO, Director of Community Impact, 2013 
 
Therefore, many interviewees expressed concerns over the opportunity for the misuse of 
Restore Act funds. Additionally, despite the fact that BP Restore Act funds brought in 
new money, this money was not always available to CBOs who had to expend more 
resources to respond to those affected by the spill. 
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Changes in Context 2007-2013 CBO Effects 
Challenges Benefits 
Political/Economic   
National    
 Shutdown Decrease Funding; perceived 
hostility 
 
 Biggert-Waters Uncertainty for insurance rates  
 Rise in Tea 
Party 
Perceived hostility  
 Rep. to Dem. 
President 
MS less power to gain fed $ Administration friendlier to 
social services 
State    
 Rise in Tea 
Party 
Perceived hostility; opposing 
helpful federal legislation 
 
 Change in 
Governors 
Difficulty navigating new 
power dynamics 
Less unrestricted power than 
Governor Barbour 
Local    
 Rise in Tea 
Party 
Obstructing CBO projects and 
collaborations; perceived 
hostility; thwarted outside 
investors 
 
 Less insular  Community more tolerant of 
outsiders and new ideas; less 
NIMBYism 
 Easier to 
organize at 
grassroots level 
 Increased organization and 
advocacy at grassroots level 
 Regional 
Unification 
 Less CBO competition; more 
cross-sector and CBO 
collaborations 
Additional Disasters   
 Great 
Recession 
Decreased available public and 
private funds 
 
 BP Increased vulnerability for 
marginalized groups; 
possibility for misuse of 
restore funds. 
Increased $ to coast; delayed 
recession effects 
    
Table 6. 2007-2013 Changes in Context & Implications for CBOs 
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Figure 8. Timeline of Events and CBO Changes 
 
 
																																																																								
9.24.05	Hurricane	Rita	makes	landfall	
8.29.05	Hurricane	Katrina	makes	landfall	
9.1.08	Hurricane	Gustav	makes	landfall	
8.28.12	Hurricane	Isaac	makes	landfall	
4.20.10	–	7.15.10	BP	Oil	Spill	
12.07	–	6.09	Great	Recession	ends	
Fall	2007	Initial	Interviews		
2005	
2007	
2009	
2011	
2013	 Fall	2013	Follow-up	Interviews	
CBOs	engage	in	STR	efforts:	provision	of	resources	&	services	CBOs	engage	in	community	meetings	but	with	little	power	to	affect	decisions	
Coastal	advocacy	Coalition	forms	
Decrease	in	available	funds	
Increase	in	available	funds	
12.07	–	6.09	Great	Recession	begins	
Coast-wide	cross-sector	collaboration	forms	
Increased	CBO	collaborations;	cross-sector	collaborations;	grassroots	organizations		
10.1.13-10.16.13	Government	Shutdown	
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Ideology and Power 
Eco-Level Theme 
 
Sub Theme 
Interview Coverage 
# References #Interviews 
Power   155 30 
Macrosystem Ideology  47 20 
  Meritocracy/American 
Dream 
12 8 
  Blank Slate 4 4 
     
Table 7. Interview Coverage for “Power” and “Ideology” Codes 
In addition to contextual influences, power and ideology impacted CBOs’ work in 
LTR. Analysis showed that power was enacted throughout and within all levels and 
codes. In many ways it operated through ideologies that were promoted by those in 
power to explain inequalities – both preexisting inequalities and inequalities produced 
through the recovery process. Interviewees expressed an awareness of the ideologies that 
impacted their daily work and lives on the Gulf Coast. Most CBO leaders were critical of 
these ideologies, while other leaders attempted to use them to advantage their work. The 
ideologies that were mentioned most often included Bootstraps mentality or Meritocracy 
ideology and the ideology of the American Dream.  
Meritocracy ideology and bootstraps mentality. Interviewees reported that 
bootstrap mentality was widespread among politicians and communities on the Coast. 
Bootstrap mentality is an extension of meritocracy ideology that explains social 
inequalities by tying success to talent and hard work. (Littler, 2013). MSGC 
“Bootstrappers” emphasized that people should “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” 
and not look to others for help. Both notions put the onus on the individual such that 
success or failure is solely the responsibility of the individual. In other words, if someone 
has not succeeded, it is their fault for not working hard enough or pulling themselves up 
	 
67	
by their bootstraps. This ideology perpetuated, or perhaps enacted, a pervasive fear on the 
MSGC that people that giving people in need even a small amount of assistance would 
result in widespread fraud and government dependency. The state capitalized on this fear 
to explain why it directed almost the entirety of CDBG funds to economic development 
and homeowners and not to renters, elderly residents, or those on government assistance. 
They gave to those who had “earned” it by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps. 
This leader explained how this ideology operated in LTR: 
I’ll tell someone that I do Katrina-related legal aid, and they’ll say, “Oh, those 
people are just taking advantage of the government.” And I’ll quietly walk 
away…And they’ll say, “Those people, they need to get out of those trailers and 
go to work. They need to pick themselves up by their bootstraps.” And one of my 
elderly clients who is on SSI said, “[CBO leader], you know, my boots washed 
away.” And I said, “Yes, Ma'am.”  I’m sure there are some people out there that 
are taking advantage, but the majority, the vast majority of people that are in need 
of assistance and receiving it, are hard-working parents of small children and 
elderly who were getting by before and are now really marginalized. And really, 
the disabled and the elderly are hard to house. And it’s not their fault. 
- Advocacy CBO, Legal Aid Coordinator, White female, 2007 
 
The client in this quote emphasized that having boots is a privilege not afforded to all 
people – a fact obscured by meritocracy ideology. This ideology made it possible for the 
government to direct funds away from those who most needed it, because it justified this 
move by arguing that needing help in the first place implies one does not deserve help.  
This mentality affected CBO on the MSGC because in order to make progress 
they had to navigate these fears and perceptions. Many housing advocates and CBO 
leaders described having to be careful of the language they used, noting the taboo of even 
saying the words “affordable housing” instead of “workforce housing” as the former 
implied a handout. For instance, one housing CBO repeatedly had to defend itself 
asserting that its clients were “working poor”. 
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I think the big misconception about [the CBO’s housing program] is that these 
aren’t families that are coming off of Welfare or extreme poverty. In some cases, 
they do get assistance, federal assistance, but families that are buying our houses 
are – they are working poor. They’re teachers aides, in some cases teachers, 
deputy sheriffs, they work in the service industry, they’re nurses aides. These are 
families that all too often they aren’t a lot of opportunities for them as far as 
housing solutions and more often than not the situation they’re in, they’d never be 
able to afford or purchase their own home if it wasn’t for [our agency] or other 
agencies working with them.  
–Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
By asserting that clients were “working poor,” this leader both buys-in to meritocracy 
ideology and tries to circumvent its effects that create a hierarchy of the working poor as 
more deserving than the non-working poor.  
This bootstrap mentality was deeply embedded in Mississippi’s identity and 
further perpetuated by Mississippi’s sense of independence from the rest of the nation 
and the federal government. The dominant recovery narrative described Mississippi as 
pulling itself up by its bootstraps, not waiting on federal assistance as New Orleans had 
done. The following quote illustrated this narrative and this leader was careful to 
distinguish the MSGC from New Orleans: 
The people from New Orleans responded differently than the people on the 
Mississippi Coast. The day after, and part of it, too, was ‘cause they stayed 
underwater, to give them that huge credit. But that morning after the storm, we 
were rebuilding. And we weren’t whining to the national media saying, “Help 
us.  Help us.” We were rebuilding and as far as to recover, it’s just to get back to 
normal. And that three-year report I gave you gives you some milestones or 
benchmarks, but that doesn’t tell me necessarily that we’re recovered. What tells 
me I’m recovered is that I could go eat a shrimp po’ boy down the street and then 
go drink a beer at my friend’s house and watch a football game like I did before 
the storm. That’s recovery.   
- Business nonprofit, President, White male, 2007 
Interestingly, this ideology persisted despite the fact that Mississippi received a 
disproportionate amount of recovery funds based on the amount of damage it received 
compared to Louisiana (Weber & Smith, 2013).  
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However, after multiple disasters this mentality was tempered a little. The MSGC 
continued to face many challenges despite the fact that they worked hard. For example, 
the following leader explained that the Biggert-Waters Act’s impact on Mississippi was 
unfair and that the MSGC deserved better because they had worked hard. 
And that's why, when they were here from D.C….there was a gentleman in the 
audience that had a very good point. “We did what they asked us to do. We built 
back. We started working back in the community. We got the community back up 
and going. You told us we were going to be grandfathered in. We all kept our flood 
insurance intact, and nobody expected it to stay,” as the gentleman said that day, “at 
these very, very low rates, but to try to use Mississippi after you asked them to be 
first and to do all this stuff as the backbone to making the National Flood Insurance 
Program whole isn't fair because we don't have any more or any less natural 
disasters than Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and the East Coast.” So, if that 
happens, there won't be a recovery for the area and, and not only will there not be a 
recovery, you know, there's going to be just a complete downturn in the economy, 
so... 
- Lender/Educational CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
In other words, once privileged groups began to experiences challenges, the meritocracy 
ideology began to break down, leading to a cognitive dissonance that continues to play 
out. 
American Dream. Another prevailing ideology related to meritocracy ideology 
and bootstrap mentality was the notion of the American Dream. Though the American 
Dream includes many types of values, in this case, the valorizing of the nuclear family 
and homeownership prevailed. Interviewees noted that one of the reasons some of the 
people fell through the cracks was because volunteers and state politicians subscribed to 
these values, only wanting to help those who fit into the American Dream. Those groups 
who did not fit this image were left out of programs and services. Often, these groups 
were those who needed assistance the most. The following interviewee described the 
frustration of securing help for renters and landlords: 
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In fact if you – pretty much now if you drive down the kind of any neighborhood 
in Biloxi, and if you see a house that is sort of like is sitting there without much 
happening, it's probably a rental property, and so the people who own that 
property have not gotten any help.  There was one – the state came up with a 
rental program – rental assistance, but it kinda came and went…most of these 
non-profit volunteer groups were not interested in helping landlords. And, in fact, 
this is something that's really interesting to me – one of the kind of values that 
these church groups bring is they put a high value on the individual rights of the 
homeowner to be back in their house. And so, to help, say, a landlord get a rental 
property back online is against that value because you're not helping the kind of 
“noble homeowner”. You're actually helping a businessperson, which is 
understandable, but it really shows a certain kind of value placed on the kind of 
individual and their right to be made whole instead of stepping back and saying, 
“Okay, what's the overall housing needs?” We need rental housing. We should 
help a certain number of landlords so we have rental housing so we can have 
affordable places. But these volunteer groups, they're looking for – they're looking 
for the kind of touching story, you know. 
-Housing CBO, Architect, White male, 2013 
Not only did this commitment to American Dream values disregard those people who 
needed help the most but it also created more work for CBOs and hardship for 
community members. By forcing these values on people, was more harmful than 
beneficial. A housing CBO leader explained the problem of forcing American Dream 
values on people: 
The only problem they’re having now that I see is that the [private funders] who 
believed that everybody should get a free house wouldn’t listen to us. I spent days 
and days and days and days with him trying to talk him [out of] this whole idea 
that if people lost a house they deserve a bigger house. I said, “But these folks 
didn’t pay rent. The only thing they did on a house was pay utilities. They 
inherited it. They had very low costs. When you get this big house with three 
bedrooms, up in the air, with all these utilities and this fancy stuff, they can’t pay 
for that.” Well, he insisted…Well, now, those people can’t live in those houses, 
and they’re foreclosing on them. So, that’s been a problem…You know, 
[Interviewer], not everybody’s capable of being a homeowner. 
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013 
 
Blank Slate. Another pervasive ideology on the Gulf Coast was the idea that 
Hurricane Katrina created a blank slate. This ideology perpetuated the notion that 
Hurricane Katrina was the great equalizer that affected everyone equally, leaving a tabla 
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rasa from which to rebuild. However, most interviewees recognized that the Coast was, in 
fact, not a blank slate and that this rhetoric concealed the fact that both disaster and the 
subsequent recovery tended to worsen the situation for those who lacked access to 
resources prior to disaster (Klein, 2007). A few interviewees, who agreed with this 
notion, felt that the state had missed an opportunity to rebuild something better from the 
blank slate. However, most interviewees did not find this ideology useful because (as 
ideologies are wont to do) it hid the power dynamics and processes that had been at play 
for decades. The following interviewee explained the ways in which the blank slate 
rhetoric had been used in LTR and the ways in which it was “fallacious”: 
But the competing visions come from those with something to gain from looking 
at what happened to this Gulf Coast in terms of a natural disaster, from looking at 
this area as a blank slate. The idea of the blank slate has been so prevalent 
throughout this process that that's what's allowed the new urbanist come 
in.  That's what allowed Smartcode, that's what, you know, it's what's allowed for 
a vision of seeing Hurricane Katrina as an opportunity – I have no opinion either 
way – as an opportunity to create something different, hopefully better, while still 
maintaining aspects of the past. You know that's what we've heard.  Maybe if you 
talk to you know someone on this that's what you hear…But it hasn't played out in 
reality exactly as it was, sort of, envisioned. The blank slate idea, first of all, is 
fallacious because we're not a blank slate…And while I think I agree that we 
could have used what happened as an opportunity to, perhaps, right injustices of 
the past, in terms of residential segregation, and in terms of a lot of different 
issues that Mississippi is just very, very well-known for...  
- CBO, Community Empowerment Specialist, White female, 2007 
 
However, disaster does not create a blank slate from which to build; rather it writes itself 
onto the existing landscape, altering it in ways that benefit some and hurt others (Klein, 
2007). Blank slate ideology begs the question: Who is it that gets erased? Or who or what 
is made blank? Not only does the blank slate ideology conceal the ways in which disaster 
and recovery have been inequitable, but it also allows for certain groups’ struggles to be 
rendered invisible. Therefore, when CBOs educate government officials or the 
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community on the struggles of these individuals, these struggles appear surprising and 
unrelated to the history of systemic racism that undergirds their struggles. CBOs must 
work from the fact that marginalized groups’ plights do not disappear just because they 
are rendered invisible by recovery efforts and ideological proclamations of a blank slate. 
CBO leaders emphasized the impact on their work with these groups – trying to raise 
awareness of these issues.  
 Analysis of contextual and ideological influences revealed that CBOs experienced 
challenges at multiple levels (see Table 8). In fact, the majority of challenges that CBO 
leaders discussed were not internal challenges but challenges stemming from the political 
and economic context within which they worked. CBOs developed strategies and took 
part in new roles in order to counter these challenges. 
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Levels Challenges CBO Effects 
Historical Context Perception of racism 
 
 
History of segregation  
Difficulty recruiting professionals and obtaining outside 
funding. Assumption of CBO racism. 
 
Discrimination in disaster effects and recovery processes. 
Macro Great Recession  
 
Plantation Economy 
 
 
 
Rise of Tea Party 
 
 
Meritocracy/American Dream Ideology  
 
 
 
 
Insular culture 
Decrease in available public and private funds.  
 
Gave “white wealthy landowner” group a monopoly on 
power, wealth, and decision-making (often along racial and 
class lines). 
 
Cuts in government spending on social services and increase 
in general public hostility toward social services. 
 
Used to explain inequalities in disaster recovery; Kept $ 
from most needy by implying that needy people do not 
deserve help.Perpetuated values that privileged certain 
groups over others in recovery. 
 
Led to distrust of outsiders and outsiders within/NIMBY-ism 
Exo Government shutdown  
 
Conservative small government  +Gov. 
Barbour’s power  
 
Gov/Bus elite privileged  
 
Biggert-Waters Insurance Act 
 
 
Changes in administration 
Affected CBOs who received federal funds. 
 
No accountability for recovery $ spending.  
 
 
Economic development over community.  
 
Created uncertainty for homeowners, particularly low-
income 
 
Must learn to navigate new power dynamics. 
Meso Lack of CBO voice in decision-making 
 
 
Illusion of voice 
 
Business interests over community interests 
 
 
Distrust of government 
CBOs unable to direct recovery in a way that benefitted 
community. 
 
Distracted CBOs and wasted their time and resources. 
 
Govt worked to put more money in the hands of corporations 
instead of community members. 
 
Difficult to work with government entities. 
Micro Lack of unified vision among CBOs in STR 
 
Lack of grassroots leaders 
Distrust and competition among CBOs; duplication of 
services. 
 
Community members largely uneducated on recovery 
processes; no coordination. 
Individual Illusion of Voice  
 
Staff cuts  
 
Frustration & Disillusionment with 
government 
Staff stress & burnout. 
Table 8. CBO Challenges and Effects by Ecosystems Level 
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CBO Roles in Long-term Recovery 
Eco-Level Theme Sub-theme 
Interview Coverage 
# References #Interviews 
CBO CBO Roles*   326 29 
  Funding Conduits 15 9 
  Intermediary actors 76 24 
  Advocates/grassroots 
organizers 
24 13 
  Government 
watchdogs 
14 7 
  Cross-sector 
collaborators 
61 21 
  Researchers 25 15 
     
Table 9. Interview Coverage for “CBO Roles” Codes 
*Aggregated references from sub-themes 
 
Within this challenging political, economic and historical context, CBOs 
continued to serve and advocate for the communities in which they worked while also 
navigating their burgeoning roles in disaster recovery. While these roles were murky and 
nebulous in 2007/8, by 2013/4 these roles were more clearly defined. Additionally, 
interviews indicated that CBO leaders were more confident in their ability to carry out 
these roles. As the literature suggests, many CBOs found themselves serving as funding 
conduits, cross-sector collaborators and intermediary actors in the disaster recovery 
period. As recovery transitioned from STR to LTR, the number of CBOs discussing these 
roles increased. In particular, “Cross-Sector Collaboration” codes emerged more 
frequently in the 2013/4 interviews. Additionally, “Advocacy” surfaced as a “child node” 
under “Intermediary Actors,” with almost all CBOs in 2013/4 involved in advocacy of 
some sort. An analysis of these 2013/4 interviews revealed additional CBO roles that 
emerged in LTR, including roles related to research, grassroots organizing, and acting as 
government watchdogs. These roles were often played simultaneously. CBOs balanced 
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these multiple roles by forming collaborations with other CBOs as well as across sectors. 
Collaborations allowed them to play different roles at different times. Notably, CBOs’ 
work on the Coast did not always neatly fit into these categories as their work crossed 
boundaries and involved tasks that could be categorized in many different ways. 
However, for the sake of clarity, I present them here discretely, beginning with their roles 
related to funneling recovery funds.  
Funding conduits. As the literature suggests, CBOs in this study sometimes 
functioned as funding conduits, funneling government or private money through their 
organizations to other organizations or targeted groups within the community. Most 
often, CBOs functioned as funding conduits as a result of their collaborations with other 
organizations. For example, if an organization did not have the capacity to manage large 
sums of money or did not have the qualifications necessary to receive these funds, partner 
CBOs would offer to act as a third party. One CBO leader discussed collaborating with a 
construction organization that was threatened by its inability to apply for grants. The 
CBO assisted by acting as a funding conduit for the construction CBO: 
And so, we really started partnering with other organizations that were actually 
doing the construction… they had that figured out; who needed it, how to get 
people there, how to match them up, how to house those volunteers, how to do all 
of that, how to manage the construction. They were not a 501(C)(3), however, and 
so, to access grant monies was impossible just about for them. And so, what we 
did was say, “Ok how can we assist with this?”  
– CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013 
 
Not surprisingly, CBOs playing the role of funding conduits was associated with the 
increased number of partnerships among CBOs on the Gulf Coast. It also encouraged 
transparency and accountability of government entities and other CBOs. For example, 
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serving as a funding conduit served as a sort of checks and balances that allowed an 
objective third party to make sure monies were spent appropriately.  
We got money from USDA to give to [Healthcare CBO] to build a clinic in 
[nearby town]. So, it’s like we do a lot of pass through. Somebody’s got to do it. 
… You know trying, a lot of things have got to go through a third party. I guess 
that’s what it is.  
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013 
 
Having CBOs available to function as funding conduits also helped secure more funds for 
the Gulf Coast by meeting outside funders’ requirements. 
Despite these benefits, most recovery money on the MSGC did not come through 
CBOs but rather was handled exclusively by the Governor’s commission and funneled 
through business nonprofits that had been created for that sole purpose. Additionally, 
analysis of interviews revealed that only a handful of agencies were operating within this 
conduit role because this role required a certain amount of capacity that most CBOs 
lacked. Therefore, the CBOs on the MSGC acting in this role were longstanding, well 
established organizations that had experience handling large funds and were 
knowledgeable on how “the system” worked. In other words, the strongest organizations 
were participating in this role. This role, in turn, increased their capacity by giving that 
organization insider information on how funds were being spent on the Coast and by 
increasing their partnerships with other agencies. Notably, other CBOs also benefitted by 
partnering with these more established CBOs who had the capacity to handle large funds 
and manage grants. This role was not widespread among interviewees’ organizations, 
however. 
Intermediary actors. In addition to this funding role, CBOs on the MSGC also 
described taking on an intermediary actor role by communicating information across 
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multiple sectors. In these interviews, CBOs were involved in communicating important 
information “up” from the community to those in decision-making positions – 
particularly, lawmakers and politicians for the local or state government. They also were 
involved in disseminating dissemination “down” from policy-makers to the community. 
This role proved complex, as it required navigating political power dynamics on one hand 
and accessing hard-to-reach populations on the other. When communicating community 
concerns to policy-makers, CBO leaders often had to be strategic and creative. One 
interviewee, perceiving the political environment to be hostile towards his organization’s 
constituents (immigrants), communicated community concerns creatively through a 
prayer service held at a congressman’s office: 
We work very closely also with [another Advocacy CBO]. Just the other day I 
picked up Bishop from the diocese, and we had a brunch at the St. Peter at the Sea 
Episcopal Church. We co-sponsored this event to go to our congressman... We 
walked to his office and did a prayer there, a prayer service for his support for 
immigration reform. So, we did that with [the other Advocacy CBO].  
– Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013 
 
Another organization used a mutual education format to communicate concerns to 
lawmakers, simultaneously hoping to learn what was going on at the policy-level:  
We are hosting a forum in December to bring our Representative […] in to talk 
about what's – to give an update. He was just here on his September break, and 
we've asked him to come in December and speak to our Community Advisory 
Board group to give us an update right before the year-end as to what's going on, 
hoping that there’ll be some progress made…we've been involved with other 
conversations about other people that are working on the issue and how we think 
it's going to impact our homeowners and really just giving feedback that they can 
hopefully take back to D.C.  
– Lending/Education CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
 
In this example, the CBO set up an opportunity to communicate concerns to policy-
makers and for the community to learn about processes at the policy-level that could 
affect community members. This strategy also encouraged politician accountability to 
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and interaction with the community. CBOs consistently used tactic such as these to more 
effectively communicate with both communities and policy-makers and to facilitate 
conversation between them. 
In addition to communicating community concerns to policy-makers and 
government officials, CBOs also disseminated important information regarding 
government policies and practices to the community. Community members were not 
always aware of the policies or programs that affected them, nor did they know how to 
apply for these assistance programs if they knew of their existence in the first place. 
CBOs helped to fill that gap. One leader explained the important work of a coalition that 
worked with the Vietnamese fishermen community – an very insular, working class 
community that was severely affected by the oil spill:  
And the [Advocacy CBO], which is a long-term coalition. I don’t even remember 
how long it’s been, but there’s a group that formed after the oil spill, which is 
basically to help the fishermen…. just to get information to the community in a 
timely manner, you know, dissect it, interpret it, and translate and documents, so, 
the fisher community understands what was going on. That was a real important 
void that they were filling.  
– Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013 
 
Therefore, communicating information to the community involved more than just 
disseminating information; it also meant ensuring that people understood the information 
and its implications for their recovery. 
As the literature and the above quote show, CBOs were able to reach hard-to-
reach populations that the government had not been able (or had not tried) to reach. State 
and local governments relied heavily on local CBOs in this study to outreach and educate 
these groups. They also used CBOs to translate government documents and interpret for 
government officials. Notably, this role proved difficult for CBOs. Not only was it 
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difficult to understand the policies and information they were disseminating but it also 
was difficult to get into these communities in the first place. Two interviewees were 
discussing a successful tax assistance program that they implemented with the deaf 
community and then paused to reflect on the difficulty of “getting into the community,” 
which had less to do with bridging a language or cultural barrier and more to do with the 
time and effort it took to build relationships and gain trust:  
Interviewee 1: So, we had interpreters on hand but only if necessary. So, that’s 
really nice; that’s really good. And so, we’re trying to expand that to some other 
underserved populations as far as access to getting free taxes done. 
 
Interviewee 2: But, you know, one thing that you mentioned, it also reminds me 
how hard it was even to get into that community in the beginning. And, you 
know, how, [we] wanted to do homeownership things too, but it was very difficult 
to get into the community. 
-Housing/Advocacy CBO, Executive Director and Community Organizer, White 
women, 2013 
 
Analysis showed that just because CBOs were able to reach unreached populations, does 
not mean it was easy for them to do so. Even well established CBOs did not always have 
the resources to do the outreach that the government expected of them. This advocate 
explained the difficulty in outreaching and educating clients in applying for government 
programs: 
The problem is that for the Vietnamese, you can’t refer [them] because they don’t 
speak English; you have to go with them, and we don’t have enough manpower to 
go with them. And you refer them, let’s say, to DHS for food stamps. If DHS 
don’t have anyone who speaks the language, you can’t send people there to 
complete a form and do the interview. So, we have to have someone to go with 
them and that’s where our issues come in because we cannot have our staff go 
from one point to the next. And again, it means that we just stretching. These are 
unfunded services that we do. But we can’t turn people away. It’s like Catch-22… 
You kind of always have that a struggle within yourself. I mean, if you don’t do 
it, the community members won’t get the services that they need. If you do 
provide a service, then you’re stretching thin, and you’re losing resources. 
- Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013 
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To expect CBOs to fill this information and outreach gap without additional resources put 
undue burden on them that only the larger organizations were able to handle without 
significant strain.  
Advocates and grassroots organizers. Although analysis showed that CBOs 
were acting as intermediary actors that conveyed important information across sectors – 
primarily, between the government and community – it also revealed that these roles 
were not always benign or apolitical. In fact, they often took on a more political 
character, such that conveying community concerns more resembled advocacy, and 
communicating information to the community became an opportunity for grassroots 
organizing. In fact, most CBOs in this study surfaced as advocacy organizations in 
2013/4. Unlike in 2007/8, CBOs were not just informing policy-makers of community 
concerns but also pressuring them to make decisions in the best interests of the 
community. CBOs recognized that just communicating information was not enough to 
enact change: 
We go to various meetings to highlight some of the, the needs of community to 
the City Council, take them to state officials and things like that. But, but do we 
have an impact? I just don’t see it at this point. 
– Advocacy CBO, Branch Manager, Asian male, 2013 
 
In order to enact change, beginning in 2008, CBO leaders took on a more advocacy-
driven role, a role that coalesced in to an organized coalition by 2013/4. The following 
CBO leader explained the goal of this collaboration: 
And our goal was to try to present a unified front on issues of fairness and equity 
and racial justice in the setting of the disaster response because it appeared to us 
that there was just a lot of what people called at the time “disaster capitalism” in 
the way, which is basically trying to figure out how to take advantage of people's 
sort of personal and political dislocation to produce some outcomes that we didn't 
like.  
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
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Recognizing that advocacy was too hard to accomplish on their own, Coastal CBO 
leaders chose to collaborate in order to advocate for issues that were important to their 
community, namely affordable housing.  
Even CBO leaders who were primarily service providing organizations were 
involved in the coalition, recognizing that it was difficult to provide services without 
taking an advocacy position. One leader described how he became involved in advocacy 
for Latino/a immigrants and their children: 
And what has happened in the past 5 years is their children now are school age. 
So, they’re now coming into the school system. To where our services were 
needed as far as translating in the school and teaching them and advocating as 
well because we’ll run into a lot of anti-immigrant sentiments. Those in the 
[school] district and other places were unlearned in regards to how the No Child 
Left behind Act would impact those that were undocumented, especially the 
children. And we had to educate them on those and then in some cases advocate 
to the point of threatening legal action or taking it to a higher posture within the 
district. And many of them willingly, seeing that the writing on the wall kinda 
backed off and in their words, “allowed” these children to have public education. 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2013 
 
Therefore, many service-only organizations took on an advocacy role. This advocacy led 
to the education of both government and community sectors, as the previous interviewee 
continued explaining: 
And, and in that process of advocacy, we wound up doing outreach and education 
to those that were actually, for lack of better adjective, the violators. So, we had to 
educate them as well. And then that advocacy posture, we also outreached to our 
community to tell them these are basically the laws of the land here as well.  
 
In tandem with this increase in advocacy in LTR, more grassroots organizing and 
collaborations among other CBOs emerged, turning information dissemination to 
community members into an opportunity for community organizing. For example, in 
2007/8, CBOs began educating the community about certain government policies and 
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practices related to recovery. As a result, community members decided to form grassroots 
organizations in order to continue to educate themselves and to hold government 
accountable. In fact, the controversy over the diversion of CDBG housing funds to the 
Port of Gulfport actually helped spark grassroots organizing and serves as a good 
example of that process. It began when some CBO leaders researched the allocation of 
Port money, discovering that it was indeed diverted from a housing program. Then, one 
CBO posted this information for the community: 
Our [CBO] members went online and looked at the MDA site. They [MDA] 
didn’t make it known that they were doin’ that [diverting funds]. And after one of 
our [CBO] members exposed it, then that’s when we put it out on the line, and 
people were made aware that it was happening. 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2007 
 
Once they learned of this information, people at the grassroots level began questioning 
the information they received from the media and politicians on a regular basis and 
decided to form their own community educational programs asking important questions 
related to power: 
Well, many of those that are at the grassroots level, like we are in our 
organization…we’re asking questions and we’re not going over what the media 
says. We’re not bein’ blind – we’re not bein’ broadsided or blindsided by the 
media and the spin doctors and things of the media…So, there’s the education 
piece and most people just be satisfied on what they see on the news on recovery. 
And a good example of that would be about a month after the storm – local media 
was pumping everything up as “on the road to recovery.” “On the road to 
recovery.” Yes, we are on the road to recovery, but everything they showed was 
the tourism industry… So we asked local organizers and grassroots activists and 
advocates have organized and do our own education piece and outreach to get to 
the communities that may not know actually what’s goin’ on. 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American female, 2007 
This community investment in education itself led to increased consciousness-raising in 
the community and a persistence to be heard:  
So there’s posture within the community unified saying, “Hey look, we do have a 
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voice. Let’s get together” to where they’re starting to develop what they call a 
block campus – say “Hey, this is how we want our community, let’s organize 
within our community and get our communities together so we can voice what we 
want.” 
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2007 
Therefore, once CBOs educated the community, the community began to organize with 
grassroots leaders in response to the Port, which prepared it to address future issues of 
concern, like the allocation of the BP Restore Act funds.  
By 2013/4, even more grassroots organizations had formed, and they were more 
organized and collaborative with other organizations. This increase in grassroots 
organizations was, in part, due to CBOs investing in educating and organizing the 
community and keeping effected community groups connected to each other. In fact, one 
CBO made it its mission to develop grassroots leaders: 
I believe it was in 2008 when the Board and the members changed the mission to 
development of grassroots leaders, building the capacity of grassroots leaders, and 
[this CBO] being the vehicle for doing that through leadership training and the 
community organizing to allow our member organizations in forming 
neighborhood organizations to lift up the issues that were important in their 
community. And [this CBO’s] role was really to provide the backend support to 
make that happen.  
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013 
 
One CBO leader emphasized the importance of developing grassroots leaders who would 
advocate for themselves and their community. However, he felt that this process was not 
quite complete: 
But, if you empower the group and gave them the power to know how to do that 
and to be able to function as a group, then they can go out, when these issues 
come up, they can go and tackle the folks and say, "Okay, well you're not going to 
do this, we're not going to vote for you next time. And we organized enough to 
get these votes out for somebody else.” And when they hear that, they gonna have 
to change the whole picture. And how people support you and your issues, you 
know? So, politically, we have not gotten our folks stronger in the community to, 
to demand those kind of things. 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013 
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While the Coast saw increased grassroots organizing, advocacy, community education, 
and consciousness-raising by 2013/4, CBO leaders agreed that there was still work to do 
to enact change on the Coast. Based on these interviews, MSGC CBOs seem well 
positioned to work with grassroots leaders to do so. 
Government watchdogs. Increased community organizing and advocacy led to 
another new role for CBOs in LTR – that of government watchdog. Interviewees noted 
that holding the government accountable to ensure an equitable recovery took an 
enormous amount of time and resources, such that entire organizations and job positions 
were formed just to take on this task. For example, MSGC CBOs collaborated to form a 
new CBO entirely devoted to keeping track of government spending and to hold it 
accountable to the communities undergoing recovery. This CBO even proved more 
effective than the state legislature. 
At the same time the legislature in Mississippi tried to create an oversight 
committee to watch how this federal money was being spent and the legislation 
passed, but the Governor vetoed it. So there's been very little transparency in how 
that money has been spent. A lot of groups that are members of the [Advocacy 
CBO], in some moves since Katrina, have really tried to stay on that and really, I 
think, what they know is about all that is known about how that money has been 
spent.  
-Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2007 
 
An interviewee from another CBO explained that his primary job was to understand 
government policies and hold the state government accountable: 
And I spent, really pretty much from that point forward, I spent my time trying to 
understand sort of the policy as it unfolded and how the organizations were 
responding and looking at the affordable housing issues mostly; to a lesser extent, 
looking at the fair housing issues. And trying to engage with the people at the 
Governor's office about the way that they were designing the housing program, 
which was very opaque. It was only one card folded over at a time, and no 
publically disclosed comprehensive plan about how the money would be allocated 
and distributed….  
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
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Many CBOs and leaders devoted an enormous amount of their time and resources to 
following paper trails, understanding convoluted language and bureaucracy of 
government policies, and documenting these findings in a way that could be used to 
educate the public and put pressure on the government for more transparency and 
accountability.  
I think that the thing that you could say that we’ve done the most effectively is 
been a thorn in the side of the governor. And that’s not that effective outside of 
just him being annoyed – he’s gotten a lot of national press and he dogged at that. 
People here don’t care really so it almost is useless in a way to do press in 
Mississippi cause people are like, “Governor’s done a lot of good for us.” So 
that’s what I would say would be our primary accomplishment, and we’ve moved 
him in tiny, tiny little ways. 
-Advocacy CBO, Volunteer Advocate, White female, 2007 
 
By being a “thorn in the side” of the government, by 2013, CBOs had been somewhat 
successful, even securing a $132 million dollar transfer in funds from the Port back into a 
housing program in 2010 (MDA, 2010; MCJ, 2016; Robertson, 2010). 
 Cross-sector collaborators. Despite inevitable tensions that emerged between 
CBOs and government officials as a result of playing the “government watchdog,” CBOs 
were more than willing to work with government when the time came. In fact, 
cooperation with government and other sectors was very important to MSGC CBO 
leaders and, they believed, was key to their success: 
The reason that I think we are well-regarded at this point is because we were 
willing to call government to accountability, but when the occasion came, we 
were willing to meet with and work through on using data and using systems that 
we thought were objective and trustworthy – a solution to the problem. I think 
that's very important. 
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
Therefore, CBOs were very interested in cross-sector collaborations because they 
recognized that collaborations were key to finding solutions to community problems and 
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for CBO sustainability. The most successful and sustainable CBOs on the MSGC were 
those CBOs that were flexible and “willing to work with anyone.” Not only did they 
collaborate with businesses, the community, and local and state governments, but they 
also collaborated with the federal government as one interviewee explained: 
And probably the biggest thing is that I actually was asked by the HUD secretary 
to serve on a task force this past year with him and nine other people on second-
term housing policy as it related to White House housing policy as it related to 
disaster. So, yeah. It’s kinda crazy. 
-Housing CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
This same interviewee expressed the importance of collaborating across sectors when 
asked if his organization was a model for others in similar circumstances:  
 
Yeah. I think so. You know, both in on our approach to the services and the needs 
within the community, but then also the creativity there at the ground level, but 
then also in our approach – and this is probably more so – our approach and 
creativity in how to engage governmental entities. Really the basic philosophy is 
that we’ve got to make it easier for them to say “yes” than it is to say “no.” 
Anything creative and innovative, their default answer is going to be “no” 
because it’s not familiar. [laughs]. And so, you know, we’ve found a lot of… 
yeah, we’ve found a lot of creative ways to get things done.  
  
CBOs learned to be strategic in their collaborations, especially those with government 
entities.  
Cross-sector collaborations often put CBOs in the role of trainer for other sectors. 
In the 2013/4 interviews, CBOs discussed training government officials and sometimes 
other CBOs in different issues related to capacity-building, cultural sensitivity, and 
working with the community more generally. CBOs working with immigrant 
communities were particularly likely to be involved in educating the community and 
government officials on cultural sensitivity. Often they became involved with the 
government initially because officials needed translators and interpreters. The following 
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leader explained how they began training city employees, first establishing a relationship 
by helping translate documents, which led to training government officials on cultural 
differences and sensitivity: 
Interviewee 1: So, we have to be very careful in terms of how to –  
 
Interviewee 2: Approach the people. Yeah. But the city, too, they do a pretty good 
job. We work with the city also on reaching out to the community. They have it 
[disaster kit] in Vietnamese and Spanish. Although, remember the Vietnamese 
language was terrible that day? 
 
[laughter].  
 
Interviewee 1: Right. Yeah, they used a Google translator…I mean, because the 
problem is that they don’t have anyone speaking the language working for the 
City, so they assumed, “Hey, it looks like Spanish; so, alright, it’s Spanish.” So, 
but when we look at it and say, “What the hell are you saying? It doesn’t say 
anything at all,” and then they say, “Ok well, you tell me.” Because that is wrong 
information you send out. They tried to let me know how “we had this translated 
in different languages.” But those languages were not accurate.  
 
Interviewer: Sounds like there’s still a lot of work to do to educate other 
organizations and the government about reach hard-to-reach [groups]. 
 
Interviewee 1: Oh yeah. Especially the city…They had the good intentions. But 
then again, the result is not worth it. 
- Advocacy CBOs, Branch Manager/Program Director, Asian male/Mixed race 
female, 2013 
 
In this exchange, it is clear that the city not only expected these CBOs to do outreach for 
them, but it also expected them to translate the disseminated information. These CBOs 
took advantage of this situation and used it as an opportunity to educate the city on 
Vietnamese and Hispanic cultures:  
Interviewee 2. You know, it’s a job, truly, he can tell you that. I mean, to inform 
your community, to inform people who are in the court system, to inform them 
about different cultural behaviors of the Vietnamese… you had to really educate 
the American people: the nurses and the school teachers, stuff like that. So, like I 
said, it is an ongoing process because you have to know sometimes why people 
behave a certain way, you know? Especially in the courts.  
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Interviewee 1: Yeah, as well as it’s different cultural values so, you have to 
understand the culture and values effectively…So, those kind of things that we 
have to train as culture competency. You have to understand the culture to serve 
effectively the populations. 
- Advocacy CBOs, Branch Manager/Program Director, Asian male/Mixed race 
female, 2013 
 
These cross-sector trainings were sometimes informal, occurring through daily 
interactions, and sometimes they were more formal taking on the form of seminars. Even 
CBOs who were not involved with immigrant groups provided training on community 
work. Regardless of the form of these collaborations, cross-sector collaborations led to 
increased CBO access to people in positions of power, which increased CBO capacity to 
enact change and “get things done” on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.  
Researchers. My analysis revealed an additional role that undergirded all the 
other roles and that is largely absent from the literature – that of community researcher. 
In addition to their service provision, advocacy, and recovery roles, CBOs on the MSGC 
worked as researchers or investigators in their community. Of course, CBOs must always 
be on the lookout for the newest best practices in order to remain useful to their 
communities; therefore, they devoted time to research evidence-based practices best 
suited for their clients. Additionally, many CBO leaders were expected to conduct needs 
assessment before implementing programs as well as to conduct program evaluations to 
provide feedback to funders. Notably, interviewees emphasized that program evaluations 
were difficult to conduct when undergoing LTR, in part, because of the many roles they 
played. The following quote explained the difficulty of conducting program evaluations: 
I think the other challenge that we have…is evaluation of our work because it’s a 
collaborative effort…And I was saying that I needed help with creating a process 
evaluation for the – doing around our young males of color, and they’re bringing 
in people to help us… and I think that’s one of the things that is a challenge and 
that we have to continue to work on is yeah…we could say we were successful, 
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but not a formal evaluation. And I think that’s one of the things I want to see us 
grow in is to methodically when anything we’re launching, not only putting out 
the goals, the objectives, the strategies, the activities, but then we’re also at the 
outset saying “And how will we know that we were successful, and what kind of 
evaluation will we do at the end of the day?” So, I think that’s very important. To 
continue to assess…and evaluate the work that we complete.  
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013 
 
This leader indicated that evaluations with collaborations were especially difficult. 
Interestingly, CBOs also explained that collaborations helped them build capacity needed 
to do program evaluations in the first place. 
In addition to researching program effects, CBOs in this study also researched 
government policies and investigated recovery funds, which was difficult because the 
convoluted and political terrain they must navigate complicated tracking government 
spending. In other words, playing the government watchdog role necessitated constant 
research into political processes. This research was further complicated by the political 
“spin” and government bureaucracy through which they must sort. As shown above, 
entire job positions and CBOs were devoted to researching government policies and 
funding allocations. Another way in which CBO leaders acted as researchers was by 
providing the government and other sectors with results from community needs 
assessments. They even expected CBOs to provide them with important community data, 
as the below quote showed: 
Now, there’s no official census going on because Latinos – whether they’re 
documented or undocumented – few will submit a census. And the census going 
on here locally are based on a 2000 census. So, they called our organization and 
asked us for numbers and again, we didn’t go physically out there and calculate. 
We can just easily say – because we saw the numbers increase to multiple usage 
and fortunately, the Wal-Mart was one of our places, you know you walk in – 
probably three out of five people walking in the Wal-Mart are Latino. And, of 
course, there were quite a bit of contractors callin’ me – businesses were calling 
me – wanted Latino workers. And I’m not a employment agency, but yet they 
were callin’ me because I’m in the Latino community and everyone was givin’ 
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them my number sayin’, “He’s the one you gotta go to and talk to. He’s the one 
that basically knows just about anything and everything about the community.”  
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latino male, 2007 
In addition to his other duties, this advocate was expected to have community-level data 
despite his lacking research skills and resources to conduct such research. Ultimately, in 
order to take part in any other roles and to be sustainable, CBOs must engage in some 
form of research. The most successful CBOs were the ones who were continually 
researching new best practices, able to provide evidence for program success, able to 
provide needs assessment data, and willing to try new things. As previously shown, these 
tasks were difficult to complete when understaffed and without funding or appropriate 
skills.  
As shown, CBOs’ roles in LTR were difficult and complex, and MSGC CBOs 
recognized early on that they must team up in order to fill these roles. Collaborations 
allowed CBO to match skills, such as grant writing, funds management, and research 
skills with needs. All of the CBOs interviewed valued collaborations with other CBOs 
and community members. In fact, one CBO explained that its role in the community was 
making sure that the community leaders across sectors were at the decision-making table: 
There’s a lot of, and I would say maybe even on our part, skepticism that 
grassroots organizations, local people, are gonna be left out of the process to plan 
and propose projects around restoration, and so, I see [this CBO’s] role, for 
example, in being able to convene all of those different groups to be able to say 
“what is our plan to make sure that – not [this CBO’s plan] but the plan of all of 
the partnering organizations that have an investment – in insuring that they have a 
seat at the planning table, that their community members have a seat at the 
planning table. So, that kind of convening: making sure that we’re all coming 
together and that we’re working together to make sure that all of the different 
organizations and individual community members, that we have a strategy to 
make sure we’re at the planning table.  
-Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013 
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These roles proved essential to fighting for equitable recovery on the MSGC and for 
achieving sustainability for CBOs facing a challenging political and economic climate. 
CBOs on the MSGC recognized this benefit and by 2013, had developed strong 
collaborations in which CBOs and community members, freely sharing resources, skills, 
and information. 
Long-term Recovery and Funding Challenges 
Much of the impact of LTR on CBOs (and CBOs’ impact on it) has been 
discussed in connection with contextual influences and the many roles that CBOs played 
in LTR. However, given the pervasiveness of funding challenges for CBOs in LTR, this 
topic merits additional attention. Therefore, the following section presents key challenges 
related to funding and the ways in which CBOs on the MSGC responded to those 
challenges. Not surprisingly, the most common challenge mentioned by interviewees in 
2013/4 was funding. Arguably, funding is always a concern for nonprofits, but these 
interviewees noted that the particular LTR context exacerbated typical funding problems. 
Whereas money was flowing into the Coast during STR, by LTR, national attention and 
funds had moved elsewhere. Additionally, the recession compounded the funding problem 
by severely limiting the amount of funds available from both private and government 
sources. The government shutdown and cuts in funds for social services also had a 
tremendous impact at the local level. Despite all of their success, even the strongest CBOs 
were uncertain of their long-term sustainability.  
I mean the funding squeeze is just, I’m, you know, it’s hard to stay effective when 
your funding is cut and cut and cut. And I think the backbone organizations have 
been flexible, have been adaptive, have been through bad times before. What’s 
different now is none of us see a light, we don’t see what the light is at the end of 
the tunnel. Obviously, the local community cannot make up for the losses in 
government funding. And when I meet with my peers, we’re all shaking our heads 
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and saying fast forward is not clear, and we all are keenly aware of the cliff that it 
wouldn’t take much to push us over. So, even though the services are going on – 
there’s no sense of certainty that we’ll be able to continue to do this.  
-CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013 
 
Most CBO leaders directly linked funding challenges to national political and 
economic climate. As mentioned previously, the rise of the Tea Party locally and 
nationally was perceived to present both direct and indirect challenges. The following 
interviewee who worked for a Catholic CBO felt that the tone of the national political 
context was growing increasingly hostile toward CBOs. She described the indirect and 
direct effects of that tone in the following quote about the defunding of a national 
organization that supported her CBO: 
…there’s all this fundamentalism that’s going on, how they’ve just attacked 
Campaign for Human Development terribly. They’ve really attacked it and gotten 
the bishops to look at who they’re [CHD] affiliated with, and if they’re affiliated 
with any kind of group that’s questionable, maybe Planned Parenthood or any gay 
organization, anything, they make them take the funding away. And the right 
wing of the church along with Boehner’s groups and all that have put this pressure 
on the bishops to stop the Campaign for Human Development…and the 
Campaign for Human Development is very ecumenically – it really provides 
funds for community organization in poor communities…And so they’re going 
after organizations that are known for working with poor people and helping 
people to become empowered to their own voices. So, you know, in Mississippi, 
it’s always been that way – it’s nothing new. But for something to go at that level 
of the Campaign for Human Development, that’s big business. 
- Housing/Advocacy CBO, Community Organizer, White female, 2013 
This national context, while having direct effects on CBOs’ funds, was perceived as 
hostile to CBO leaders, increasing their uncertainty in their organizations’ futures.  
This funding issue had various effects on CBOs’ operations – from service 
provision and advocacy to staff burnout and cuts. However, lack of funding also hindered 
organizations’ capacity to look for other funds. After staff cuts, one executive director 
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described trying to balance many jobs, which in turn affected her ability to spend time 
garnering more funds: 
We are non-profit. And as executive director it’s really my job to reach out to 
funders and generate the funding that we need for the work that we’re doing. And 
because we’re short-staffed, I have been spending a lot of my time doing 
programmatic work. I just recently hired someone to help me with grant writing 
and grant management…so, I feel like we’re going to be more successful this 
year. I hope we are. Because I’ve been so involved in the day-to-day 
programmatic work, and that was just because of not having all the staff we need. 
But I think that’s one of my biggest challenges for the organization is we’ve not 
created enough funding to be assured that we don’t have to worry about every 
year “are we going to have enough money, you know, to cover our budget?” So, 
funding issues are one of the biggest issues for [this organization].  
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013 
 
Many groups expressed lacking the capacity to garner funds that would, in turn, increase 
their capacity. This vicious cycle was a concern for almost all CBOs, even the strongest 
organizations. 
The most successful CBOs were those that were able to hire grant writers to go 
after funds and manage grants, as the above interviewee was able to do. However, not all 
CBOs were able to do so, and grant writing had to be completed by staff, without skills in 
writing or managing grants, whose main jobs were service provision.  
And when I think about myself doing a proposal for funding for the the inner 
children, for tutoring, mentoring girls. Why are we denied every time? Why are 
we denied affordable childcare, in-home childcare, women are getting their 
education to keep children at home? Why are we denied? Because we don’t know 
how to put this professional grant in place? But the person that has professional 
writing skills to put it in package get the funding, but they’re not doing the work.  
- CBO, Executive Director, African American female, 2013 
This CBO leader explained the frustration of failing to secure funding for work she was 
already doing in the community, while other people who were not as involved in the 
community were able to secure that funding because they were skilled in grant writing. 
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 The above interviewee also raised an important issue that resonated with other 
leaders – the blessing and curse of working with external funders. In order to address 
issues with funding, MSGC CBOs realized the need to diversify funds and transition from 
relying on federal funds to a mixture of external national foundations and local private 
funds. The most successful organizations were those that were able to maintain long-term 
partnerships with external foundations to sustain funding streams.  
One of the things that happened during the recovery period was, of course, there 
were tons of generous people from all over the country who were interested in 
supporting recovery efforts and there were foundations interested in directing 
their charitable giving toward recovery efforts. And so we benefited from some 
new foundation partnerships during that period that we’ve been able to parlay into 
ongoing funding support, especially for [one of our programs]. And that’s been 
really helpful. 
- Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
While external funding was necessary to CBO success and sustainability, it also 
presented issues. For example, external funders were often unfamiliar with the local 
setting and entered with their own agenda, assumptions, and requirements. These 
requirements for funds did not always fit local needs.  
Well, like I tell you, go back to the money. You know, the money we have, the 
money has dried up. We, you know – the other ones that are giving money, 
they're specifically giving it for the things they were designed originally to do it 
for. Like, [National Funding Foundation]. [This foundation] normally gives 
money for children's education, child development, and stuff like that. Uh, and so 
they not going to give you any money. So, you have to fit whatever they have set 
up to get funding, whereas before, those monies were kind of like administrative-
type monies, you know, money you could use to hire people to do stuff with, and 
it didn’t have as long as it was for Katrina relief – you know, you could do it, but 
now that's not true. Katrina days are over, you know. That money has dried up. 
–Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013 
 
This executive director explained that operational funds that were available after 
Hurricane Katrina were no longer available. Instead funders wanted to implement their 
pet projects locally. 
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While recent disasters, like the oil spill, brought new recovery money to the 
Coast, this funding was not always available to CBOs, again, because funders 
misunderstood community needs. 
Interviewee: I mean in a nonprofit agency and a social service agencies, funding 
is always a challenge to meet the need of the people that are requesting assistance. 
When the BP oil spill happened, people was coming to [our CBO] when they lost 
their jobs. They wasn't going to BP saying, you know, “I need rental assistance” 
or “I need utility assistance” or “I need food.” They was coming to [our CBO]. 
So, you know, funding opportunities is always a challenge in trying to meet the 
needs of the community.  
	
Interviewer: Did BP put any funds in here? 
 
Interviewee: Like, three years later… it probably was two years after the fact that 
they actually gave us some funding. It was about 40,000 dollars…We didn't 
receive a dime when the need was the greatest, you know.  
-CBO, Executive Director, African American male, 2013 
Because Restore Act funders did not consider that community needs might involve 
helping CBOs who were serving all those groups affected by the oil spill, they were not 
offered funds initially. 
External funders, while necessary to capacity building for local CBOs, could also 
add to their stress by unchecked assumptions and arbitrary requirements that made 
collaborations difficult. As previously discussed, MSGC CBOs collaborated with each 
other in order to build capacity and to be more competitive for funding. In fact, many 
external funding organizations required CBOs to collaborate in order to receive funds. 
Unfortunately, funders also made it difficult to collaborate while requiring that CBOs 
collaborate in order to receive funding.  
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I think in many ways funders are part of the barriers to collaboration because the 
reporting they want or the, all of that does not jive with what others want to do. 
And then, of course, the cut back in funding, you know, part of you says well if 
there’s, you know, we will work together more cooperatively and that way we can 
share resources but it really turns out when I look at collaboration, it doesn’t save 
money. It increases impact and capacity. But it, it’s not about saving money. 
-CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013 
 
This leader recognized that collaborations were not about saving money and that they were 
often more difficult because of arbitrary requirements from funders.  
Additionally, external funders sometimes held offensive assumptions about the 
local leaders and tried to influence them to make decisions in line with the foundation’s 
interests instead of with the community’s interests. However, CBOs leaders had grown 
savvy by 2013/4. They knew how the system worked. They had experience with 
foundations and with working in collaborations. They supported each other in navigating 
these issues with external funders. One interviewee explained that she had learned to play 
the game: 
But I think one of the interesting things about [Large National Funding 
Organization] – and we all, we all snipe at this – they really think we’re a bunch of 
idiots. “You know, those people in the South aren’t too smart. We really have to 
guide them.” Like we don’t know we’re being guided…. I mean, even in the 
[organization]: “Oh, keep talking. I love the way you sound”… And, of course, 
when somebody says that, I just lay it on like you wouldn’t believe. And I talk just 
like the Delta. I can do it so well. I can make any word be two or three syllables if 
you want me to. We’ve gotten over that now ‘cause I’ve outsmarted the girls a 
couple times. I said, “I might talk slow, but I think fast. So watch out.”  
- Housing & Advocacy, female, 2013 
Learning to “play the game” was one of the major strengths that CBOs demonstrated in 
LTR. It helped them navigate difficult political terrain, external funders, and the competing 
roles that demanded their time and resources. 
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CBO Strengths 
Eco-Level Theme Sub-theme 
Interview Coverage 
# References #Interviews 
CBO CBO Strengths   60 16 
  Advocacy 4 3 
  Mission (flexible, 
outside of disaster) 
12 6 
  Collaborations 26 10 
     
Table 10. Interview Coverage for “CBO Strengths” Codes 
 I conclude this analysis with a brief summary of some of the CBO strengths that 
emerged in LTR. As mentioned above, learning to “play the game” or to navigate 
complex power dynamics was one of the biggest strengths displayed by these CBO 
leaders. Leaders learned to capitalize on the ideologies, outsider assumptions, and 
business interests by using them to their advantage. For example, the CBO leader above 
learned to use outsiders’ assumptions that slow speech was tied to small intellect in order 
to catch people off guard and to find out important information. As she said, “I might talk 
slow, but I think fast. So, watch out!” When playing the game did not work, CBOs 
exhibited other strengths, such as advocacy, adapting their mission, and forming 
collaborations to enact change on the Coast and to ensure their sustainability. 
Advocacy. Those CBOs who were successful were those who added themselves 
an advocacy component to their organizations’ mission or who were involved in 
advocacy collaborations. Even those CBOs who were hesitant to label themselves as 
advocates, recognized that community problems were multi-leveled and knew that they 
would have to move beyond service provision to enact higher order change. Many of the 
leaders were also involved in national initiatives. The following CBO was one of the few 
	 
98	
that did not include advocacy as part of its mission, but even this CBO recognized the 
strategic importance of advocacy: 
Our board made its first, took its first advocacy position last year. That’s, that had 
been an area that they were, no, we’re not going there. And there were some 
legislation that to look at early education, preschool and mandatory kindergarten 
and our board stepped out and took a position on that. As part of our strategic 
plan, we’ve recognized that advocacy is, we need to develop that capacity…And 
so that’s hard to know how to do.  
– CBO, Director of Community Impact, White female, 2013 
 
This analysis showed that successful organizations included service and advocacy, which 
involved working with grassroots leaders. One leader summarized this finding succinctly: 
And this is what I’ve failed to really push on is that one of the biggest difficulties 
in our work with poor people and communities is that we’ve separated the 
advocacy, the direct services, and the community organizing.  It needs to be a 
three-legged stool. And until these three groups begin to understand that they’re 
all working together with the same purpose, but have different focus and can work 
with each other, no one of these groups can work without the other to make any 
successful change. 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, White male, 2013 
 
In LTR, service provision was incomplete without community organizing and advocacy. 
These characteristics made for a strong, sustainable CBO in LTR. 
Mission outside of disaster. Another strategy that CBOs on the MSGC employed 
that added to their strength was striking a balance between sticking to their pre-disaster 
missions and remaining flexible to changing needs and contexts. For example, although 
many disaster-related needs still existed in LTR, interviewees noted that maintaining a 
disaster-related mission was difficult in LTR in part because funders were no longer 
interested in the area and had moved on to other disasters. The following interviewee 
described a CBO that really prospered in STR but struggled after recovery money dried up: 
And they were a loose-knit group that didn’t even really call themselves into 
being until a disaster occurred. And then after Katrina, they have continued to try 
to exist as a functioning organization with a staff person, which was never true 
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before Katrina. And so that’s a new chapter in that organization’s history. So I 
don’t know, I think obviously the ingredients are mission and funding. And the 
mission has to be one of integrity and [that] resonates with people and be 
demonstrated in the life and work of the organization... Because a mission this far 
out that’s still connected to recovery is on thin ice…there’s still consequences that 
people are facing that are connected to Katrina, but being a recovery organization 
in 2013 is hard to do. So, people who were that have had to find new identities.  
– Housing CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
 
Having a mission that included but also expanded upon recovery was essential. 
Additionally, CBOs must have a mission based upon community needs and concerns. 
They must be flexible enough to respond to a changing context without changing the 
overall goal of the organization. 
 Finally, one of the biggest strengths of CBOs on the MSGC was their ability to 
form collaborations – both with other CBOs and across sectors. In 2007/8, CBO division 
was still an issue, but collaboratives were increasing; by 2013/4 CBOs showed a 
particular adeptness at working together.  
As of right now, here in East Biloxi, we have a group of probably about 20 to 24 
maybe different entities in the community…And so, we meet on a monthly basis. 
It’s called the [Community Collaborative]. And we have been meeting, I know, 
consistently for over the past year. And so, we are fledgling along with trying to 
really gain the trust and the input, and we’ve got some subcommittees that meet 
around health, civic engagement, education, economic security, and different 
things. And so, I’m really, really excited about this. This came as a result of, you 
know, the things that happened with Katrina: the desire to build the network and 
linking the pieces together. We have a lot of work to do. But I am optimistic that 
we’re going to be able to really cement this collaborative for the betterment of this 
community.  
-Healthcare CBO, Executive Director, White female, 2013 
 
CBOs not only engaged in collaborations, they were also excited about them, were 
actively seeking them out, and were good at them. 
In addition to CBO collaborations, CBOs had begun to reach out to government 
and business sectors in an effort to increase their capacity and their connections to people 
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in power in order to enact macro-level change. 
I have been saying to my staff that a measure of our success is creating unlikely 
allies. And that could be with the business community, and it could be with the 
governor’s office…I have to challenge myself personally to reach out to people 
who I maybe have seen as my adversary to extend the hand of partnership and 
wanting to work together where we can.  Sometimes we can’t work together on 
certain things… The other thing is, where we can, is to build partnerships with 
businesses, and help businesses better understand what our work is as, as a 
nonprofit…And it’s this whole thing about yes, you know, we want to build 
partnerships and collaborations, and the first thing that comes to my mind is “Oh! 
What nonprofits are going to be involved?” What doesn’t come to mind 
immediately is “What businesses are going to be involved?” And, and is there a 
role for state government and/or the Federal government in this? But that’s the 
kind of thinking that needs to happen…I don’t know that it’ll change the power 
dynamics, but I think it’s certainly going to make us more successful in the 
initiatives that we are launching and trying to get addressed…I know that I have a 
certain view of maybe a business. I have a certain view of government. And they, 
in turn, have a certain view of nonprofits and our work. And the only way that we 
can begin to break down maybe stereotypes or fears about the other is to, is to 
begin to talk about how we can work together on particular initiatives and to reach 
out to each other. And that’s what we gotta do. 
- Advocacy CBO, Executive Director, Latina female, 2013 
 
CBOs used cross-sector collaborations to gain access to power in the decision-making 
process and also used them to break down barriers and dispel myths and stereotypes. 
These types of collaborations required patience, creativity, and humility. 
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Chapter 7. Discussion 
Conceiving of CBOs in a disaster context as entities affected by and affecting 
multiple ecological levels was helpful in locating LTR challenges and CBO strengths. In 
fact, many of the interviewees seemed to view things quite ecologically. Because a 
disaster impacts all levels and changes the system, understanding it in this more 
comprehensive way was more useful than conceiving of it as merely an event from which 
to recover. Disaster sets into motion a change to the system that can harm and/or help the 
other systems, entities, communities, and individuals in it. This framework was useful in 
organizing my codes, guiding my analysis, and presenting my results. Please see Figure 4 
below. Future research on CBOs in disaster contexts might benefit from using this 
ecological framework.  
 
 
Figure 4: CBO Disaster Ecological Systems Model  
of LTR Challenges 
 
Results from this study indicated that contextual factors at macrosystem and 
exosystem levels have implications for CBOs operating in LTR. While studies often 
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assume that CBOs are affected primarily at the local level, this study revealed that CBOs 
were impacted by national and state political and economic contexts in addition to the 
local context. In fact, the national political context became even more relevant in LTR for 
CBOs on the MSGC, particularly, with the rise of the Tea Party and the cutting of social 
service funding. Interestingly, findings showed that multiple disasters, like the oil spill 
and Hurricanes Isaac and Gustav, were not as significant for CBO operation in LTR as 
were the influence of the state and national political contexts. Additionally, this study 
showed that issues related to history, racism, power, ideology, and the geographical 
context presented certain challenges to CBOs operating in LTR. 
This study found that in spite of these challenges, CBOs in LTR were continuing 
their STR roles of funding conduits, cross-sector collaborators, and intermediary actors. 
Additionally, in LTR, they were taking on advocacy roles as well as were involved in 
more grassroots organizing in LTR. Due to the fact that they lived in a political context 
that afforded certain politicians free reign with little accountability, CBOs were also 
serving as government watchdogs. Finally, in order to play any of these roles well, CBOs 
had to conduct their own research and investigations. They researched best practices for 
their organizations, conducted community needs assessment for emerging needs in the 
LTR, and conducted program evaluations in order to assess their work and provide 
feedback to their funders. They also functioned as investigators, following state money 
and keeping updated on state recovery policies. These roles were overlapping and 
complex and CBOs sometimes struggled to fulfill these additional LTR roles without 
additional resources. 
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CBOs managed all of these roles and challenges by forming collaborations with 
other CBOs. In parallel with the disaster capitalist approach of the state government, who 
took advantage of the disaster context – what they termed a “blank slate” – to enact 
economic development projects that benefitted the wealthy, CBOs on the Gulf Coast used 
the disaster context as an opportunity to develop a tightly woven web of organizations 
and community advocates to coordinate service provision and to advocate for interests of 
the community in an unprecedented way for that area. Taking advantage of an 
“everybody knows everybody” community, CBOs were able to hold the government 
accountable to their small area, which turned out to be a full-time job. 
In addition to forming collaborations with other CBOs and community members, 
CBOs who were most successful (i.e., were still operating, conducting services or 
advocacy, and had future plans for their organization) in LTR were those that were able 
to “diversify” their funds, were able to find a balance between sticking to their mission 
and remaining flexible, included both service provision and advocacy in their mission, 
and were involved in collaborations with other sectors including business and 
government sectors. CBOs who were primarily service organizations in 2007, mentioned 
adding an advocacy component to their mission in 2013, recognizing that having the 
funds and the space and the capacity is not enough to enact change if they don’t have the 
power to do so. Ultimately, collaborations, increased (or added) advocacy, and learning 
to navigate a complex web of power dynamics has contributed to the success of CBOs on 
the Coast to influence recovery processes and to continue to thrive as organizations. 
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Table 11. CBO Response to Challenges by Ecological Systems Level 
 
	
Levels Challenges CBO Effects CBO Response 
Historical 
Context 
Perception of racism 
 
 
 
History of segregation  
Difficulty recruiting professionals and 
obtaining outside funding. Assumption of 
CBO racism. 
 
Discrimination in disaster effects and 
recovery processes. 
Increased CBO collaborations in order to 
share resources. 
 
 
Educating community members and 
government leaders on current needs. 
Macro Great Recession  
 
 
Plantation Economy 
 
 
 
Rise of Tea Party 
 
 
 
Meritocracy/American 
Dream Ideology  
 
 
 
 
Insular culture 
Decrease in available public and private 
funds.  
 
Gave “white wealthy landowner” group a 
monopoly on power, wealth, and decision-
making (often along racial and class lines). 
 
Cuts in government spending on social 
services and increase in general public 
hostility toward social services. 
 
Used to explain inequalities in disaster 
recovery; Kept $ from most needy by 
implying that needy people do not deserve 
help. Perpetuated values that privileged 
certain groups over others in recovery. 
 
Led to distrust of outsiders and outsiders 
within/NIMBY-ism 
Worked to diversify funding; increased 
partnerships with CBOs. 
 
Took on more advocacy and government 
watchdog roles to increase voice in decision-
making. 
 
Engaged in grassroots organizing to educate 
the community; continued working to forge 
cross-sector collaborations.  
 
Engaged in grassroots organizing, community 
education, & needs assessment research to 
show the existing needs in the community. 
Continued in collaborating with other CBOs 
to coordinate services to vulnerable groups 
 
Used PR and community education to address 
concerns toward “outsider” groups. 
Exo Government shutdown  
 
 
Conservative small 
government  +Gov. 
Barbour’s power  
 
Gov/Bus elite 
privileged  
 
Biggert-Waters 
Insurance Act 
 
Changes in 
administration 
Affected CBOs who received federal funds. 
 
 
No accountability for recovery $ spending.  
 
 
 
Economic development over community.  
 
 
Created uncertainty for homeowners, 
particularly low-income 
 
Must learn to navigate new power 
dynamics. 
Worked to diversify funding; increased 
partnerships with CBOs. 
 
Took on a investigative and government 
watchdog role. 
 
 
Increased CBO advocacy; formed cross-
sector collaborations 
 
Housing CBOs included education 
component in services  
 
Took on a investigative and government 
watchdog role. Continued to forge cross-
sector collaborations.  
Meso Lack of CBO voice in 
decision-making 
 
Illusion of voice 
 
 
Business interests over 
community interests 
 
 
Distrust of 
government 
CBOs unable to direct recovery in a way 
that benefitted community. 
 
Distracted CBOs and wasted their time and 
resources. 
 
Government worked to put more money in 
the hands of corporations instead of 
community members. 
 
Difficult to work with government entities. 
Increased cross-sector collaborations, 
grassroots organizing, and advocacy. 
 
Took on more of an investigative researcher 
role and a government watchdog role. 
 
Continued to advocate for community 
members.  
 
 
Community grassroots organizing to work to 
keep govt accountable and increase in cross-
sector collaborations. 
Micro Lack of unified vision 
among CBOs in STR 
 
Lack of grassroots 
leaders 
Distrust and competition among CBOs; 
duplication of services. 
 
Community members largely uneducated on 
recovery processes; no coordination. 
CBO leaders worked together to share 
resources and coordinate services. 
 
Invested in developing grassroots leaders. 
Individual Illusion of Voice  
 
Staff cuts  
 
Frustration & 
Disillusionment with 
government 
Staff stress & burnout Invested in mental health services for staff; 
formed collaborations to share 
responsibilities and  reduce burden on staff. 
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Chapter 8. Future Directions 
Given findings that challenges at the state political and economic level were 
sustained throughout STR and LTR as well as the fact that the national political and 
economic context became even more relevant in LTR, I propose that future research 
further investigate the intersection of state and national politics with CBO participation in 
LTR. In particular, researchers should examine the ways in which ideology perpetuated at 
state and national levels has real-world impacts on CBO social service provision and 
advocacy efforts. For example, this study revealed that the rise of the Tea Party 
movement in state and national politics had financial and emotional impact on CBOs and 
CBO leaders; future research should examine the specific aspects of this movement and 
its ideologies that have had adverse effects on communities and CBOs. Quantifying these 
adverse effects at an individual and community level would help policy-makers fully 
understand the impact of national politics on the most vulnerable populations. 
Additionally, given the finding that CBOs utilized certain strategies, including increasing 
collaborations, advocacy, and cross-sector collaborations, to navigate this complex 
political environment, future disaster research might work to quantify these strategies in 
order to disseminate them to other CBOs struggling with similar challenges. Finally, 
disaster recovery researchers and practitioners should consider developing multi-level 
interventions that target these more macrosystem level challenges.  
Dissemination of Findings 
In addition to informing future research, the results from this study could be used 
to inform policy-makers and government entities that affect long-term recovery. Because 
most of the LTR challenges emerged from the state and national level, targeting federal 
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organizations involved in disaster policy or disaster funds allocation may be most fruitful. 
These findings could be disseminated in the form of a policy brief to government 
agencies involved in recovery policy and fund dissemination. For example, a policy brief 
disseminated to HUD could show the adverse effects of HUD’s decision to waive federal 
stipulations on Community Development Block Grant funds granted to Mississippi. This 
brief could suggest that these stipulations not be waived in the future and, in fact, could 
argue for the addition of further restrictions based on this study’s findings. For example, 
this study showed that CBOs spent a large amount of time and resources tracking 
government funds and protocols. Federal government entities might save CBOs time and 
resources by being transparent about policies and procedures related to recovery, making 
sure that these documents are easily accessible. Additionally, a policy brief might suggest 
that government entities relying on CBOs to conduct outreach and community education 
in LTR supply CBOs with the funds and resources to fulfill these roles. Ultimately, 
policy briefs would emphasize that accountability be built into the management of all 
recovery funds. No one politician should be able to direct billions of dollars without any 
oversight or stipulations. By showing the negative effects of one of HUD’s policy 
decision on many vulnerable populations and CBOs may encourage organizations, like 
HUD, to include more restrictions that prevent the misuse of recovery funds (See 
Appendix A for an example of a policy brief).  
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Chapter 9. Limitations 
 Despite its potential to contribute to disaster literature, this study is limited in the 
fact that it is geographically and contextually bound. While uniqueness of context is also 
part of this study’s advantage, it may limit generalizability to other locations and 
contexts. The fact that this area has experienced multiple types of disasters may increase 
the likelihood that findings could be generalizable to other disaster areas. Another 
possible limitation includes the bias toward more successful CBOs. Because defunct 
CBOs are harder to locate, most of the participating CBOs were more successful – still in 
operation, serving clients, and securing funding. Less successful organizations had less 
time to participate in the study or were no longer in operation. While I did include some 
struggling CBOs, the majority of CBOs were more successful organizations. Future 
research should specifically target those organizations that did not survive a disaster. 
Finally, this study was analyzed based on the thematic coding of one coder, meaning that 
other researchers might arrive at different conclusions using the same data and codes. 
However, when a research assistant coded an excerpt from the study using the same 
codebook, we achieved high agreement, suggesting that other researchers using these 
codes would yield similar coding results. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
This study is one of the first to study CBOs roles in LTR and therefore, has 
important implications for long-term disaster research. Conducted almost a decade after 
Hurricane Katrina, this study presented CBOs’ roles, challenges, and successes in long-
term disaster recovery. CBOs continued to have important impact in LTR by serving as 
cross-sector collaborators, funding conduits, intermediary actors, advocates, grassroots 
organizers, researchers, and government watchdogs despite the many challenges they 
faced at multiple systems levels. Ultimately, this study revealed that national and state 
political and economic factors influenced CBOs and the groups that they served more 
than any other factors related to disaster or disaster recovery. Therefore, if CBOs are to 
continue to function in their LTR roles, it will be imperative to understand how to address 
challenges at the macrosystems level. As federal, local, and state governments 
increasingly rely on CBOs during times of disaster, understanding how CBOs negotiate 
long-term recovery is imperative.  
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Appendices 
	
Appendix A: HUD Brief 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CBOs Involvement in  
Recovery has increased.  
 
CBOs contribute to long-term 
recovery by: 
  
CASE STUDY: Mississippi 
CBOs & Katrina Recovery 
 
 
We Recommend: 	
CBO work is impeded by political and economic factors outside of their 
control. HUD can help. 
	The	government	gives	money	for	programs	to	help	needy	people.		And	the	state	and	local	
government	takes	it	and	uses	it	
to	feed	the	pockets	of	the	rich.		
	
A	governor	should	not	have	full	
responsibility	for	the	spending	
of	the	money…There	needs	to	
be	oversight	based	on	the	
needs	that	are	there,	and	the	
communities	need	to	be	
involved	because	[the	federal	
government]	basically	gave	
Haley	Barbour,	they	just	
waived	everything		
Community-Based Organizations 
(CBOs) in Long-term Disaster 
Recovery	
Prepared for  
The United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development 
By Anna R. Smith 
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa BRIEF	
Funneling funds to people “on 
the ground” 
 
Forging collaborations across 
government, private, and 
community sectors 
 
Holding local and state 
governments accountable to 
equitable recovery practices 
 
Researching community needs 
and government policies 
 
 
Governor Barbour requested waivers from 
HUD on CDBG funds so as to distribute 
funds quickly with no red tape. 
 
HUD granted request and Governor 
Barbour had free reign to allocate funds.  
 
Majority of funds went to homeowners 
with insurance and economic 
development projects. 
 
Vulnerable populations were neglected. 
 
CBOs struggled to provide services for 
growing needs with less resources to do 
so.  
Keep stipulations in tact for 
federal aid monies.  
 
Do not allow for waivers in the 
name of expediency.  
 
Instill an oversight committee at 
the state and federal level for 
these monies. 
 
Require that recipients 
collaborate with CBOs in disaster 
area. 
 
CBOs have community trust and insider 
knowledge of community needs.   	
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Appendix B: 2008 Interview Instrument 
 
Mississippi Communities Recovery from Hurricane Katrina 
Key Informant/Key Leader Interviews 
 
I.    COMMUNITY RESPONSE/RECOVERY ASSESSMENT 
 
1.  I’d like to begin by asking you where you were living and what was your work 
before Hurricane Katrina.  Were your family and home affected by the Hurricane?  
How have you fared since?   
 
2. How did you become involved in the response and recovery in Mississippi? 
 
3. What have been your role and your organization’s role in the recovery? 
 
• Whom have you worked with? 
 
4.  What does the notion of recovery for your community mean to you?  Is it an 
appropriate term to describe what you are experiencing here in Mississippi? 
 
5. How would you gauge the success of Mississippi’s efforts thus far? 
PROBE: 
• Has the state accomplished what you had hoped by this time? 
• Why or Why not? 
 
6.  If you think about the coast in general how would you compare various community 
institutions, before Katrina and today?   
PROBE: 
• What is the housing situation? 
• How are the schools? 
• Health Care? 
• Basic services (banking, gas stations, groceries, shopping)? 
• Local government? 
 
7. What are some of the remaining biggest challenges facing ________ in terms of the 
quality of life of its people?   
PROBE:   
• Housing  
• Health/Health Care  
• Work/Employment 
• Education 
• What needs to be done? 
 
 
8. What is your overall assessment of how the process of recovering and rebuilding 
________ after Katrina has been handled? 
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 PROBE: 
• By government (fed/state/local) 
• By business (large corporations centered outside the state vs. local; small vs. 
large) 
• By nonprofits (national – Red Cross, etc.; local _____) 
• By churches 
•  
9. What would you say were the greatest successes in the process? 
PROBE:   
• What agencies, individuals or groups have been most helpful? 
• What could have been done better?  
 
10. What have been the biggest obstacles to achieving a successful recovery and renewal? 
PROBE: How has it dealt with them?   
 
11. Who is having the biggest say in how ________ gets rebuilt after the storm?   
 PROBE: 
• Why is that?   
• Are you pleased with that?   
• How would you prefer it to be? 
 
12. How has the demographic makeup of the coast changed since the storm?   
PROBE: By that I mean,  
• The numbers of people living here? 
• The racial/ethnic mix (White, African American, Asian, Hispanic)? 
• Women and men? 
• What about the age mix – the elderly, the young? 
 
13. Are there particular groups in ________ who are more vulnerable and who have had a 
more difficult time rebuilding their lives after the storm?   
PROBE: 
• What about racial/ethnic groups? 
• Has it been harder on women or men? 
• How about the poor or working class people? 
 
14. Could you describe what the challenges have been for those groups?  Why do you 
think it has been so hard for them?   
 
15. How do people of different races, ethnicities, nationalities, classes, ages get along 
in ________?  Are there tensions?  What do they revolve around?   
 
• Has the aftermath of the storm changed these relations? 
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II.   COMMUNITY COMPARISONS 
 
16.  One of the things we are especially interested in is how the nature and pace of the 
recovery has varied across communities along the coast.  Specifically, we’re looking 
at East Biloxi, Ocean Springs, Moss Point, Pass Christian, Waveland, and 
Diamondhead.   
 
• Could you describe the differences in the ways that these communities have 
responded? 
• Which have been most successful?  Which the least?  Why do you say so? 
• Which have received most Federal and State support?  Why? 
 
 
17. Please describe for me your impression of the level of trust between people in ______ 
and: 1) Local Government 2) State Government 3) Federal Government 4) Social 
Service Institutions 5) Businesses 6) Financial Institutions? 
 
 
III.  CAMILLE COMPARISON 
 
18. Were you living on the coast during Camille?  What was your experience then?   
 
19. How would you compare the Katrina and Camille experiences?   
 PROBE: 
• Did the government responses differ? 
• Recovery/rebuilding processes differ? 
• People’s responses differ? 
 
20. Do you think that Camille affected how people and agencies responded to Katrina? 
 
 
IV.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS, OVERALL ASSESSMENT  
 
21.  Were you aware that MS had requested to use hurricane recovery dollars to expand 
the port in Gulfport?  Do you Agree?  What  do you think about that plan? 
 
22.  A recent article in the New York Times indicated that the state is not using the bulk 
of Hurricane Katrina grants to help low income families even though congress 
stipulated such use.  Were you aware of that? 
 
• Why did that happen? 
• How? 
• Thoughts? 
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23.  Is the state doing enough to help low income home owners, renters, and other poor 
and working class populations? 
 
• What else should be done? 
 
 
24.  If another storm like Katrina were to arrive here next week, how do you think the 
process would be handled?  The same?  Differently? 
 
 
25. Would you describe how you think the coast will look in 2 years?  In 5 years?  10 
years?  Who will have to be involved to make it happen? 
 
 
V.   CLOSING 
 
Thank you very much for your time.  By sharing your story you will help us to better 
understand the disaster and to contribute to new strategies to make the transition and 
recovery easier for future survivors of disasters.   
 
26. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about any of the issues we’ve 
discussed today? 
 
27. Can you give me names of other key leaders who have been integrally involved in the 
recovery who might be willing to talk with us? 
 
28. Lastly, all of the responses from the interviews will be grouped together for a 
summary report.  Would you like to receive a copy of this summary report?   
 
Could I call on you again later in our process? 
 
Thank you so much for sharing your perspectives with us.   
 
 
PRESENT PARTICIPANT WITH CASH ENVELOPE AND GET THEM TO SIGN 
RECEIPT 
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Appendix C: 2008 Informed Consent 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear 
 
I’m working with an interdisciplinary team of researchers at the University of South 
Carolina, including Drs. Susan Cutter, Jerry Mitchell, Mark Piergorsch, and Mark Smith, 
on a project to assess the recovery from Hurricane Katrina is proceeding along the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast. The purpose of the project, funded by the National Science 
Foundation, is to assess differences in recovery experiences so that we can identify 
factors and processes that would enable communities to better prepare for and manage 
the response to and recovery from future disasters. 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in the study to help us understand how your 
community fared during and after the storm.  We are interested in your assessment of the 
assets, resources, challenges, and continuing needs that you and your community have, as 
well as how you assess the process of recovery/rebuilding in your community.   
 
What is asked of you: 
You will be asked to fill out a short form describing yourself (age, gender, work history, 
etc.), but you will not put your name on the form.  Then you will take part in an interview 
of approximately one and one half hours, which will be tape recorded for later 
transcription so that our research can accurately understand and describe your responses.  
 
Confidentiality: Your opinions and that of other community representatives will be 
summarized as a group.  Your name will not be recorded on the audiotape.  Your name 
and your responses will never be linked.  Thus your responses will be kept confidential as 
allowed by law. Audiotapes will be kept in a locked cabinet, which only project staff will 
have access to. Transcriptions and all identifying information will be kept on password 
protected computers behind locked doors.    
 
 
 
Your rights: Your deciding to take part in this project and answer the questions will not 
affect your current or future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any 
other organizations.  Your answers are important, but you can choose not to answer any 
question and to withdraw at any time. 
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Potential risks or discomforts:  Although there is a minor risk of breach of confidentiality, 
as described above, steps are being taken to ensure the confidentiality and security of 
your information. The questions we ask about your community will not be personal in 
nature.  
 
Compensation: At the end of the interview, you will receive $25 in cash. If however, for 
whatever reasons you chose not to complete the interview or chose to withdraw early, 
you will not receive the gift card. You may also refuse the gift card if you so chose. 
 
Voluntary Participation:  Participation in this study is completely voluntary, and will 
affect your current of future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any 
other organizations. You may withdraw at any time, for any reason, with no negative 
consequences.  
 
Potential benefits: This information will help us to better understand the perceptions of 
community leaders about the assets, challenges, and continuing needs of your community 
as you rebuild after the storm and plan for the future.  Through a comparison of your 
community’s experiences with those of other communities we hope to identify strategies 
and policies to aid communities in planning for and mitigating the effects of future 
disasters. 
 
Thank you for your consideration.  
 
With kind regards, 
 
 
 
Dr. Lynn Weber, Professor 
Women’s Studies and Psychology       
University of South Carolina      
513 Barnwell College 
Columbia, SC 29208 
Office:  (803) 777-5012 
Cell:     (803) 546-5645 
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Appendix D: 2013 Interview Instrument 
 
CBOs and Long-Term Recovery on Mississippi Gulf Coast 
Key Informant FOLLOW UP Interviews 
 
[IF NECESSARY, INSERT ANY INTRO INFO RE: THE STUDY] 
When we talked with you 5 years ago, you told us about your work with [NAME OF 
ORGANIZATION] and your involvement in the community recovery initiatives. Today, 
I’m interested in learning to find out what has happened over the past 5 years with your 
organization, with the community, and with you personally.  I’m interested in the 
challenges, the changes, and the successes as well as where you are now. Let’s start by 
talking about [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]. 
 
I.  ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
 
1. What CHANGES has [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] been through in the past 5 
years?  
PROBES: 
Changes in: 
• Mission 
• Capacity to serve your clients/constituents? In what ways? 
• Financial Status/Funding picture?  Improved? Worsened? How? 
• Capacity to achieve its overall goals? How? Why? 
 
2. What have been the major CHALLENGES for [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] in 
the past five years? 
 
3. What have been the major SUCCESSES for [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] in the 
past five years? 
4. What is your OVERALL assessment of [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] TODAY? 
5. Could you describe the ways that [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] 
COLLABORATES with other GROUPS/ORGANIZATIONS? 
 PROBES: 
• Benefits of that work? 
• Challenges? 
6.  When we were here in 2007 and 2008, the Steps Coalition was a young 
organization facing challenges.  Have you or [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] been 
involved with the Steps Coalition or other collaborative advocacy networks?   
 PROBES: 
• If so, in what ways? 
• How would you assess __(Steps/ Other Organization)___ effectiveness?  
Successes? Challenges? 
7. What new organizations have emerged or arrived on the coast in the last five years?  
• What kind of impact are they having?  (Positive? Negative?) 
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8. How would you assess the overall strength or resilience of the Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs) on the coast today compared to before Katrina? 
PROBES: 
• Would you say that some groups/organizations are WORSE OFF? Which 
ones? Why? 
• Would you say that some groups/organizations are BETTER OFF? Which 
ones? Why? 
II. RECOVERY PROCESSES 
Now I’d like to talk with you about how you see recovery and recovery processes. 
1. Some people have said there is no such thing as “recovery” from Katrina, but 
instead people construct a “new normal.” Based on your personal and 
organizational experience, what is your interpretation of “recovery”? 
  PROBES: 
• For your organization? 
• For your community? 
• For individuals? 
2. Five years ago, we asked you about the driving forces behind the recovery.  What 
individuals or groups would you say are the driving forces shaping the livelihood of 
the communities on the coast today? 
  PROBES: 
• Governor’s Office/ State government 
• Business Community 
• Local Government 
• Particular Individuals or Groups? (e.g., Gulf Coast Business Council, 
Renaissance Corporation) 
• CBOs 
3.  Thinking back over the last 8 years, which groups or individuals had the biggest say 
in how the recovery proceeded?  
 
4. Do you feel that your organization and others like it had a say in how the recovery 
proceeded? If so, how?  If not, why not? 
 
5. Which groups and individuals benefitted most from recovery processes?  
 
6. When we were here before, the Port of Gulfport expansion was a controversial 
issue.  As the project has gone forward, how do you view the Port expansion today? 
  PROBE: 
• How has it affected the local community?  The economy? 
• Has it produced the promised jobs for local residents? 
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7. Compared to before Katrina, what is the availability of AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING? PUBLIC HOUSING? 
PROBES: 
• Is it meeting the needs of low income people? 
8. When we were here 5 years ago, some leaders talked about the DYNAMICS AND 
DIFFERENTIALS OF POWER between various groups of residents, community 
organizations, the governor and his council, and business interests.  How do you 
describe them today? 
 
III. COMMUNITY CHANGES 
 
Now I’d like to address the ways that coastal communities have changed since Hurricane 
Katrina. 
1.  How has your community changed since Katrina?  How is it different? 
 PROBES: 
• The numbers of people living here? 
• The racial/ethnic mix (White, African American, Vietnamese, Asian, 
Hispanic)? 
• Women and men? 
• What about the age mix – the elderly, the young? 
• Social class—poor, working class, middle class, wealthy? 
  
• What have been the MAIN DRIVERS of these changes? 
 
• What EVENTS OR ISSUES HAVE GALVANIZED OR IMPEDED 
CHANGE over the past five years?  
(BP, ISAAC, ETC……If they don’t identify these other “events” no need to 
probe…..)   
 
INSTITUTIONS: 
• Housing? 
• Health/Health Care? 
• Work/Employment? 
• Education? 
 
2.  What are the MAJOR CHALLENGES your community faces today? 
3. What BENEFITS has your community derived from the recovery after Katrina? 
 
IV. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
Now I’d like to hear about [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]’S preparedness for future 
disasters. 
1. Looking to the future, how prepared would you say that [Name of Organization] is 
for another disaster on the coast?  
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• What is GREATEST NEED you would anticipate having in a future 
disaster? 
• What STEPS have you taken TO PREPARE?  
• Does your organization have DISASTER PLAN? 
• What are the CHALLENGES to DISASTER PREPARATION? 
2. How would you assess the overall disaster preparedness of CBOs on the coast?   
• What are their GREATEST NEEDS? 
• GREATEST STRENGTHS? 
• GREATEST CHALLENGES? 
3. What are the lessons you and your colleagues at [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] 
have learned about how the coast’s communities have been able to access the 
financial and human resources needed to recover?   
 
4. What advice would you give to CBO’s to thrive and to be prepared for future crises 
and disasters? 
 
  PROBES: 
• Resource Management/Allocation 
• Collaborations 
 
5. How do you see the future of the coast? How do you see it in 5 or 10 years? 
 
• For CBOs? 
• For Affordable Housing? 
 
V. PERSONAL 
 
1. When we interviewed community members 5 years ago, it was evident that for 
people who survived Katrina and were working in the recovery efforts, there was a 
considerable amount of stress and negative health impacts. In terms of your 
PERSONAL AND FAMILY HEALTH AND WELL-BEING, how have the last 
five years been for you and your family?   
 
2. Have you and your family experienced any other major issues or challenges in the 
past year? 
 
VI. WRAP UP 
1. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about any of the issues we’ve 
discussed today? 
2.  Can you give me names of other leaders who have been integrally involved in 
disaster recovery who might be willing to talk with us? 
3.  Lastly, would you like a copy of any reports we produce from this research? 
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FILL OUT DEMOGRAPHIC INFO SHEET HERE 
 
 
 
Could I call on you again later in our process? 
Thank you so much for sharing your perspectives with us 
 
 
GIVE $ RECEIPT FORM; $; AND RECEIPT 
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Appendix E: 2013 Informed Consent 
 
 
 
Community-Based Organizations and Long-Term Recovery along the Mississippi Gulf 
Coast 
 
Study Information 
Our research team at the University of South Carolina is continuing a research project 
begun in 2007 to further understanding of the recovery process after Hurricane Katrina 
on the Mississippi gulf coast.  In the five years since the initial interviews with people in 
community-based organizations engaged in those recovery initiatives, the area has 
experienced the BP oil spill, Hurricane Isaac, and the national housing crisis, among 
other challenges. The purpose of the current project, funded by the University of South 
Carolina Office of the Provost, is to revisit these community-based organizations, groups 
and individuals to better understand how these new challenges have affected the capacity 
and resilience of community-based organizations and the people who work in them.   
 
Your participation in the study will help us understand how your community and 
organization has fared during and after these disasters.  We are interested in your 
assessment of the assets, resources, challenges, successes, and continuing needs that you 
and your organization have and of whether the experiences in the aftermath of Katrina 
helped or hindered recovery from these more recent disasters. 
 
What is asked of you 
You will take part in an interview of approximately one and one-half hours, which will be 
audio recorded for later transcription so that we can accurately understand and describe 
your responses.  
 
Confidentiality 
Your opinions and those of other community representatives will be summarized as a 
group.  Your name will not be recorded on the audiotape.  Your name and your responses 
will never be linked.  Thus your responses will be kept confidential as allowed by law. 
Audio files will be kept in a locked cabinet, which only project staff will have access to. 
Transcriptions and all identifying information will be kept on password protected 
computers behind locked doors.    
 
Your rights  
Your deciding to take part in this project and answer the questions will not affect your 
current or future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any other 
organizations.  Your answers are important, but you can choose not to answer any 
question and to withdraw from the study at any time. 
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Potential risks or discomforts   
Although there is a minor risk of breach of confidentiality, as described above, steps are 
being taken to ensure the confidentiality and security of your information. The questions 
we ask about your community will not be personal in nature.  
 
Compensation 
At the end of the interview, you will receive $30 in cash. However, if for whatever reason 
you choose not to complete the interview or choose to withdraw early, you will not 
receive the compensation. You may also refuse the money if you choose. 
 
Voluntary Participation   
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and will not affect your current or 
future relationship with the University of South Carolina or any other organizations. You 
may withdraw at any time, for any reason, with no negative consequences.  
 
Potential Benefits 
This information will help us to better understand the perceptions of community leaders 
about the assets, challenges, and continuing needs of your community as you rebuild after 
these disasters and plan for the future.  Through a comparison of your community’s 
experiences with those of other communities, we hope to identify strategies and policies 
to aid communities in planning for and mitigating the effects of future disasters. 
 
Contact Persons 
For more information concerning this research, please contact Lynn Weber at 
weberl@mailbox.sc.edu or at the phone numbers below. If you have questions about your 
rights as a research subject, you may contact: Thomas Coggins, Director, Office of 
Research Compliance, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 at 777-7095 or 
tcoggins@mailbox.sc.edu.  
 
Thank you for your consideration. 
 
Dr. Lynn Weber, Professor 
Dept. of Psychology and Women’s and Gender Studies Program    
  
University of South Carolina      
513 Barnwell College 
Columbia, SC 29208 
Office:  (803) 777-5012 
Cell:     (803) 546-5645 
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Appendix F: Codebook 
 
 
 
Name	 Description	
Across	Levels	 Includes	themes	that	affect	multiple	levels	simultaneously.	Different	from	"Multiple	
"Levels"	which	refers	to	themes	that	can	affect	(or	exist	at)	different	levels	
depending	on	the	quote.	
Coast	Visibility	 Includes	quotes	that	refer	to	outsiders'	perceptions	of	the	Coast.	
Feelings	Attitudes	 Codes	dealing	with	emotions	or	affect	or	beliefs	toward	someone/thing	
Attitude	toward	Casinos	 	Re:	casinos	on	the	Coast	
Attitude	toward	Govt	 Could	be	local,	state,	or	national	government.	
Feeling	Devalued	Disregarded	 Refers	to	quotes	about	feeling	disregarded	or	devalued	by	government,	other	
people,	other	communities,	the	country,	etc.	
Feeling	Disillusioned	 Feelings	of	being	disillusioned	with	the	progress	of	recovery.	
Feeling	Dispirited	 Refers	to	feelings	of	depression,	being	"down"	or	dispirited.	"Dispirited"	is	the	word	
used	by	one	of	the	interviewees.	
Feelings	of	Empathy	 Underdeveloped	code	that	refers	to	increased	empathy	for	others	experiencing	
disaster	
Shock	 Refers	to	experiences	of	shock	(and	not	just	shocking	events	themeselves).	Could	
include	symptoms	of	shock	even	if	shock	is	not	explicitly	mentioned.	
Trauma	 Refers	to	experiences	of	trauma	and	symptoms	of	trauma.	Trauma	could	be	
ongoing	in	the	present	or	could	be	referring	to	past	traumas.	
CBO	Level	 This	level	includes	CBO	roles,	operation,	and	impacts	within	the	community	and	
across	multiple	other	levels.	
CBO	Challenges	 Challenges	that	CBOs	face	in	their	operations,	service	provision,	or	recovery.	Can	be	
related	to	recover,	disaster,	or	otherwise.	
CBO	Division	 Division	and	competition	among	CBOs	on	the	Coast.	
Simultaneous	Org	Recovery	 Refers	to	difficulties	experienced	when	CBOs	in	disaster	zones	are	trying	to	recover	
themselves	while	still	providing	services	to	those	in	need.	
Simultaneous	Personal	Recovery	 Refers	to	difficulty	for	CBO	staff	to	continue	working	while	undergoing	recovery	
personally	as	well.	
Slow	Recovery	 Refers	broadly	to	the	ways	in	which	the	slow	progress	in	recovery	in	the	community	
is	affecting	CBOs	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	CBO	recovery	itself	has	been	slow.	
CBO	Collaborations	 Broadly	captures	ways	in	which	CBOs	collaborate	with	other	CBOs	as	well	as	some	
of	the	experiences	of	those	collaborations.	
Female	Collaborations	 Refers	to	collaborations	that	were	female-led.	
CBO	Operation	 Refers	to	functions	of	the	CBO	at	an	administrative,	operational	level	
Capacity	 Considers	the	ability	of	CBOs	to	continue	its	operations	(therefore,	may	overlap	
with	other	operations).	
Changes	 Refers	to	changes	in	CBO	operations	as	a	result	of	disaster	or	the	recovery	process.	
Funding	 Refers	to	CBO's	funding	resources	and	strategies.	
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Mission	 Refers	to	CBO	mission	-	especially	as	it	relates	to	disaster	and	recovery.	
New	Roles	 New	staff	roles	which	have	emerged	because	of	disaster	and	recovery.	
Staff	 Quotes	that	refer	to	staff	challenges	or	successes	
Working	Furiously	 Refers	to	quotes	that	describe	the	burnout	and	constant	work	of	CBO	leaders	in	the	
immediate	aftermath	
CBO	Roles		in	Recovery	 The	different	roles	that	CBOs	are	playing	in	recovery	(LT	and	ST).	Does	not	refer	to	
immediate	disaster	response.	
Community	Gov	Liaisons	 Working	as	advocates	who	transmit	concerns	from	the	community	up	to	
government	officials	and	working	to	transmit	policy	from	government	to	the	
community.	
Cross	Sector	Collaborators	 Collaborating	across	business,	government,	and	community	sectors	to	create	policy	
or	to	influence	recovery.	
Funding	Conduits	 Managing	and	dispersing	funds	from	government	or	private	foundations	to	the	
community	or	other	CBOs	
Info	Dissemination	 Disseminating	information	to	communities,	government	officials,	or	even	national	
agencies.	Different	from	community-government	liaisons	in	that	this	information	is	
more	educational.	
Reaching	Vulnerable	Pops	 Refers	to	CBOs	reaching	hard-to-reach	populations	with	information	and	services.	
Researchers	 Conducting	needs	assessments,	researching	best	practices,	and	researching	
government	policy	and	funds.	
CBO	Roles	in	Response	 How	CBOs	worked	in	the	immediate	response	period	
CBO	Strengths	 Refers	to	qualities	or	actions	of	CBOs	that	have	been	beneficial	to	communites	and	
CBOs	operations	
CBO	Successes	 Refers	to	particular	successes	that	CBOs	have	had	
Disaster	Benefits	 Ways	in	which	disaster	has	brought	about	benefits	to	CBOs	
Influx	of	Money	 Disasters	brought	in	more	funding	opportunities	for	local	CBOs	
New	Programs	 Disaster	brought	about	new	programs	that	actually	addresses	pre-existing	problems	
exacerbated	by	disaster	
Disaster	Prep	 Steps	taken	by	CBOs	to	prepare	for	disasters	and	to	help	the	community	prepare	
for	disasters	
New	CBOs	 Refers	to	quotes	about	CBOs	that	emerged	after	disasters	
Service	Provision	 Refers	to	CBOs	services	that	they	provide	to	the	community.	
Disruption	in	Services	Operations	 Disruption	in	services	provided	to	community	due	to	disaster	or	recovery.	
Context	 Refers	to	environmental	context	that	affects	CBOs	
Geographical	Physical	Context	 Ways	in	which	the	physical	landscape	of	the	coast	(either	natural	or	manmade)	that	
impacts	CBOs	and	communities	
Historical	Context	 Certain	historical	events	or	states	that	impact	the	present	
Political	Economic	Climate	 Political	or	economic	environment	that	impacts	CBOs	on	the	coast	
Local	 Refers	to	explanations	of	local,	community	economic	and	political	context.	
National	 Refers	to	US	politics	and	economic	context.	
NO	Comparison	 Compares	the	political	and	economic	climates	of	the	Coast	and	New	Orleans	
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State	 Refers	to	state	politics	and	economics.	
Events	 	Certain	moments	that	occur	–	may	have	lasting	effects	and	overlap	with	context	
BP	Oil	Spill	 	Effects,	events,	recovery	that	occurred	because	of	the	oil	spill	in	2010	
Immediate	Response	 	Period	immediately	following	disaster.	Categorized	by	lack	infrastructure,	etc.	
Multiple	Disasters	 	Any	point	where	interviewee	speaks	of	multiple	disasters	as	an	event.	Could	
overlap	with	context	
Recession	 	Refers	to	events	and	effects	of	the	Great	Recession	and	housing	crisis	in	2008	
Exo	Level	 		
Cross	Sector	Coordination	 	Descriptions	of	CBOs	collaborating	with	business,	govt	sectors.	
Development	over	Community	 	Descriptions	of	government	privileging	business	interests	over	community	
Government	Response	 	Descriptions	of	government’s	response	to	recovery	
No	Follow	thru	 	Interviewees	discuss	no	action	in	recovery	
Progress	 	Refers	to	progress	of	recovery	on	Coast	
Priorities	 Govt	prioritizing	homeowners	with	insurance;	overlap	with	development	
Healthcare	 	Descriptions	of	state	of	or	changes	in	institution	of	healthcare	
Mental	Healthcare	 	Descriptions	of	state	of	or	changes	in	institution	of	mental	healthcare	
Policy	Inconsistencies	 	Gov’t	policies	on	recovery	are	inconsistent	and	opaque.	
Port	 	Port	as	microcosm	of	government	priorities	and	power	
Individual	Level	 		
Macro	Level	 		
Classism	 	Inequalities	based	on	class	
Disaster	Capitalism	 	Using	disaster	as	an	opportunity	to	redevelop	Coast	in	a	way	that	privileges	
business	elites	and	corporations.	Ways	to	make	money	from	disaster.	
Ideology	 	When	stories	work	to	obscure	power	and	inequalities.	Think	meritocracy,	etc.	
Racism	 	Inequalities	based	on	race	or	different	“types”	of	people	
Sexism	 	Inequalities	based	on	perceived	gender	
Meso	Level	 		
Community	Challenges	 	Coastal	community	challenges	
Continued	Community	
Challenges	
	For	2013	only.	Challenges	that	have	continued	from	STR	into	LTR	
Emerging	Community	Challenges	 	Any	challenges	that	are	emerging	because	of	the	recovery	process	
Decline	of	Community	 	Decline	of	certain	communities	in	terms	of	population	loss,	closed	schools,	lack	of	
grocery	stores,	no	infrastructure,	etc.	
Insurance	Costs	 	Rising	costs	of	insurance	premiums	to	stay	on	coast.	
Turkey	Creek	 	Environmental	injustice	of	development	projects	in	AA	community	
Erasure	 	Communities	feeling	as	though	their	communities,	history,	and	struggles	have	been	
erased.	
Exacerbated	Community	
Challenges	
	Pre-Katrina	challenges	that	have	been	exacerbated	because	of	the	storm	and/or	
the	recovery	process	
Childcare	 	Affordable	childcare	
Domestic	Violence	 	Violence	between	co-habiting	or	intimate	partners.	
Food	Deserts	 	Lack	of	access	to	healthy	food		
Living	Wage	 	Wages	not	high	enough	to	support	the	cost	of	living	
Community	Changes	 	Positive	or	negative	and	for	any	reason	
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Community	Successes	 	Events,	attitudes,	structures,	etc.	that	the	community	takes	pride	in.	
Emerging	Community	Successes	 	Perhaps	not	realized	yet,	but	perceived	successes	that	are	in	the	works.	
Grassroots	Community	Action	 	Community	members	coming	together	to	educate	each	other	and	advocate	
Advocacy	 	Fighting	for	community	interests	at	policy-level	
Education	Consciousness	Raising	 	Learning	about	power	dynamics	and	ones	place	in	those	dynamics	as	well	as	
learning	about	the	policies	in	effect	
Long	Term	Recovery	Prediction	 	Interviews	discuss	how	they	see	the	coast	in	the	future	
Long	Term	Recovery	Realization	 	For	2013	only,	ways	in	which	2007	prediction	was	correct	
Long	Term	Recovery	Vision	 	Positive	–	how	they	would	like	to	see	the	coast	in	the	future	
Regional	Vision	Coordination	 	Unification	of	coastal	counties	in	directing	recovery	for	their	area	(CBO	&	govt)	
Micro	Level	 		
Schools	 	Effects	of	recovery	or	disaster	playing	out	in	schools	
Multiple	Level	 Themes	under	this	heading	can	exist	at	multiple	levels	and	can	refer	to	multiple	
levels	depending	on	the	quote.	
Health	 	Can	refer	to	community	or	individual	health	affected	by	recovery	or	disaster	
Mental	Health	 	Refers	to	community	or	individual	mental	health	affected	by	LTR	or	disaster	
Recovery	Meaning	 	“What	does	recovery	mean	to	you?”	
Recovery	Progress	 	Assessment	of	where	the	Coast	is	in	the	process	of	recovery	
Support	 	CBO/person/community	social,	financial,	spiritual	supports	
External	Support	 	Could	be	financial	or	volunteers,	etc.	
Faith	 	Could	be	a	faith	group	or	one’s	actual	beliefs	
Government	Support	 	Could	be	in	form	of	money	of	perceived	attitude	
Social	Support	 	Friends,	networks,	families	
Volunteers	 	Help	of	volunteers	in	recovery	
Uneven	Recovery	 	Discusses	inequality	in	recovery	process	
Unmet	Needs	 	Glaring	needs	related	to	disaster	and	recovery	
Affordable	Housing	 	Could	refer	to	Section	8,	housing	stock,	etc.	
E	Biloxi	 	Lack	of	recovery	in	E.	Biloxi	and	why	
Renters	 	Assistance	for	renters	affected	by	disaster	
Rent	Increase	 	Increase	in	rents	because	of	increased	insurance	rates,	development,	etc.	
Voice	 	Having	a	say	in	the	way	recovery	proceeds	
Illusion	of	Voice	 	Govt	inviting	public	input	but	not	listening	
Women	in	Recovery	 	Women	as	the	movers	and	the	shakers	on	the	ground	in	recovery	
Power	 	Access	to	resources,	wealth,	social	capital,	decision-making.	
Knowing	the	system	 	Understanding	and	navigating	power	dynamics	
Spin	 	Similar	to	ideology.	The	stories	told	to	explain	the	process.	Media,	politicians…	
Confusion	 	Tactic	to	obscure	allocating	of	funds	to	business	by	deliberately	confusing	process	
Women	Gaining	Power	 	Women	learning	to	navigate	this	system.	
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